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Abstract 
 
Being particularly at home in critical theories of education, hope is invoked widely by theorists to render 
bearable perspectives of the politics and practices of education which leave the reader with little reason 
for optimism in education. Despite much knowledge from critical pedagogues and theorists on the threat 
of neoliberal ideologies to systems and subjects of education, one is hard-pressed to find cited research 
that would suggest educationists ought to be anything but hopeful in their teaching. In this paper, I use the 
theoretical tools of psychoanalysis as interpreted by the philosopher Slavoj Žižek to critically examine 
how hope, rather than freeing us from the present, traps us in a version of the future. Working with 
Freirean theories of subjectivity in education, I argue that hope holds us captive to our potential future 
enjoyment, and that it is thinking on and bearing the miseries of the present that can offer greater freedom 
for the subject.  
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 1 
Introduction: Hope Is a Waking Dream 
In his analytical work on philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek, Charles Wells 
writes that “every universe of meaning eventually encounters an obstacle that is somehow 
simultaneously an irrevocable lack (a lost object, a missing signifier) and an unavoidable excess 
(an excessive attachment, a meaningless signifier that insists and repeats).”1 In the universe of 
meaning structuring the philosophy of education, it is hope, the seemingly ubiquitous social and 
political affect, that serves as the excessive and lacking signifier which insists and repeats. Being 
particularly at home in critical/leftist theories of education, hope is invoked widely by 
philosophers of education to render bearable critical perspectives of the politics and practices of 
education which might otherwise leave the reader with a deep suspicion that there is little reason 
for optimism in education. Despite a wealth of knowledge from critical pedagogues and Marxist 
theorists on the threat of neoliberal capital to contemporary systems, theories, and subjects of 
education, one is hard-pressed to find widely (or even narrowly) cited research that would 
suggest educationists ought to be anything but hopeful in (or about) their teaching or their 
political advocacy.  
As a young queer educator, my own relationship to the meanings of hope, truth, and 
education have changed significantly over the past decade. Over this time, my understandings of 
these concepts have shifted from one of belief in the promises of the enlightenment, that 
education can serve as a vanguard of transformative and liberatory knowledge (I even have a 
large tattoos permanently testifying to this belief), to a position of great doubt in the power of 
education or even knowledge itself to change the minds of more than a few individual subjects at 
a time, let alone usher in a utopian social form through mass enlightenment. Perhaps the time in 
                                                
1 Wells, Charles H. The subject of liberation: Žižek, politics, psychoanalysis. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2014, p.3 
 
 
 2 
my life that has most precipitated this project was during my year of initial teacher education. 
One of the few students in my program with a background in critical theory, I was confused by 
my classmates optimistic reactions to course readings that suggested, with slightly more nuance 
(and a much lighter tone), that, in theory, teaching was an absurd and futile endeavour, harshly 
limited in practice, operating in a neoliberal cultural and political climate that reinforced both 
this abstract theoretical futility and practical absurdity, with diminishing material conditions and 
outcomes for students and educators. While we spoke of the technocratic and capitalist values 
that have always shaped teaching and learning to the detriment of the enlightenment values that 
attracted so many of us to the profession, my classmates and I passionately emulated the model 
of (unconsciously cynical) teaching set out by critical philosophers of education from Giroux to 
hooks: they know very well what they are doing but they are nonetheless doing it. 
Renowned educational theorist Paulo Freire argued that hope must dominate all our 
political and educational praxis as it is an “ontological necessity.”2 Freire’s subjective hope is 
comprised of both an element of lack (in that the subject of politics and education is born 
incomplete and must seek completion through politics and education) and of excess (that the 
subject must be perpetually aware of and driven by futurity of their hope, that the object of their 
hopes is in excess of their images of it3). For Freire, true hope, unlike naive hope or simple 
optimism, is one of the spoils of enduringly critical psycho-social and political self-reflection and 
action—much like freedom from English tyranny was eventually won through the enlightened 
affective passions and skill in combat of the True Scotsmen of old. Despair is the spectre that 
haunts Freire’s writing on the subject of hope; for Freire despair is both a cause and consequence 
of political inertia, a trap, which is produced by and serves the political status quo.  
                                                
2 Jacobs, Dale. "What’s Hope Got to Do With It? Toward a Theory of Hope and Pedagogy." JAC 24, no. 4 (2012): 
783-802. Accessed December 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20866715  
3 As I will discuss, this object is both non-existent and impossible to imagine (but not to contemplate). 
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In my project, it is the subject’s desire and the process by which those desires are formed 
which will be the cornerstone of my understanding of hope. I will argue that educational theory’s 
relationship to hope, and the hopeful subject’s relation to their desires, has become a relationship 
of what Lauren Berlant calls ‘cruel optimism’. For Berlant, cruel optimism is “the condition of 
maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss.”4 While hope is meant 
to be the affective drive of progressive political and educational projects “where cruel optimism 
operates, the very vitalizing or animating potency of an object or scene of desire contributes to 
the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in 
the first place.”5 We remain attached to our hopes, and to hope itself, not because we cannot live 
without the objects of our desires, but because, more than anything, we fear what we will 
become, what we will cease to be, if we lose our desire for those objects. 
 To understand the role of hope in educational theory we need a theoretical framework 
capable of dealing with the complexities of both psychological desire and its socio-symbolic 
meaning. In The Excessive Subject, Molly Anne Rothenberg bemoans that psychoanalysis, 
despite being repudiated by eminent poststructuralist and postmodern scholars and laypeople 
alike, continues to represent “the most interesting discourse available to the humanities” for 
understanding the ontology of the subject.6 Throughout my project I will be analogously 
following Wells’ line of inquiry regarding theories of liberation and meaning amongst 
contemporary leftists: if educators are fighting for hope, what is the hope they are fighting for 
and who, or what, is the subject that hopes?7  
                                                
4 Berlant, Lauren. “Cruel Optimism” in The affect theory reader. Edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. 
Seigworth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010, p.94 
5 Ibid., 94 
6 Rothenberg, Molly Anne. The excessive subject: a new theory of social change. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010, p. 
11 
7 Wells, 1. 
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In their works, both Rothenberg and Wells work through theories put forward by 
Slovenian philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek. As one reads further into the body of this 
project it will quickly become obvious that I privilege Žižek’s work over, perhaps, more 
academically rigorous and reputable scholars of education. A pragmatic reason for Žižek’s 
theoretical priority here is that he represents pre-eminence in contemporary heterodox 
interpretations of the works of Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, and Jacques Lacan (a disciple of both 
Freud and, less directly, Marx). Žižek’s work encompasses and draws upon large swaths of 
continental philosophy but refuses strict intra/interdisciplinary boundaries. Žižek has dedicated 
his scholarly life to enmeshing the theories of the professional disciplines (and personal 
intellectual passions), which Sigmund Freud called impossible: healing, governing, and 
educating. Most importantly, it is Žižek who has done the critical work of translating the 
Freudian subject, as understood by Lacan, into the language of socio-political theory, 
interpretation, and the symbolic world outside the limited purview of psychoanalytic theorizing 
of life within the psychoanalytic clinic—a task long ago initiated by Freud in Totem and Taboo, 
continued in The Future of an Illusion, and epitomized in Civilization and Its Discontents.8 A 
more personal reason for Žižek’s priority in my work is my admiration for his well-earned 
reputation as crassly intellectual iconoclast whose critiques of well-established psychoanalytic 
and political theories invoke a defensiveness in postmodern scholars that reveals almost as much 
about the limits of postmodern philosophy as it hopes to hide.  
The intimate link between lack, excess, subjectivity, and hope in education demands a 
unique kind of analysis. Wells argues that it is the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan and 
Slavoj Žižek which is best suited to aid us in understanding the “singular[ly] motive force” of 
“our striving to retrieve our lost objects, to be rid of our excessive attachments or at least come to 
                                                
8 1913 and 1930 respectively.  
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grips with these impossibilities that move us.”9 It is psychoanalysis more so than other modes of 
critical analysis that provokes us, as subjects of our unconscious minds, with the fundamentally 
unsettling nature of our desires. Sigmund Freud, through both Lacan and Žižek, requires that we 
consider “that when it seems most obvious to us what we want that we are at our most blind, 
ideological and manipulated.”10 It is psychoanalysis above other theories of mind and behaviour 
which can help us confront our subjective unconscious desires and help us understand how they 
take shape not only in the form of objects of hope, but in the very form of hope itself.  
The impossible disciplines (healing, governing, and educating) are so identified because 
their object of study is the subject and its universe of meaning, the embodied manifestation of the 
realm of symbolic relations. All three impossible professions take as axiomatic a subject of 
(un)consciousness, a subject who can learn, know, and reflect, but can also repress what they 
learn and experience into their unconscious. Studying the individual subject alone would be 
enough to qualify disciplines of the symbolic as impossible, but it is intersubjectivity, the 
dynamics of the relationship between subjects (and objects) which lends the most weight to the 
impossibility of the helping professions. It is within the psycho-social relations studied and 
engaged in by the impossible professions, relations necessarily mediated by ordered systems of 
meaning, that hope finds its natural home.  
In her work on subjectivity and social change Rothenberg argues that, as a being in/of 
language, the subject cannot be bound by simple understandings of external and immanent 
causes.11 Here I am following Žižek in his belief that the ontological perspective of both 
Marxism and Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis serve as superior frameworks for analysing social 
relations. In discussing the nature of the Freudian dreamwork, Žižek argues that it is a fetishistic 
                                                
9 Wells, 3. 
10 Wells, 2. 
11 Rothenberg, 3. 
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error to focus on an analysis of the content of the dream; the true secret of the dream, writes 
Žižek, is not a symbolic interpretations of the sign-objects within the dream, but in the form of 
the dream itself—why did the subject’s unconscious desire take the form of a dream?12 This 
psychoanalytic perspective will frame my discussion of hope in this project; in turning to 
psychoanalysis, I seek to question not so much the specific objects of hope desired by the subject 
of the impossible professions, but why the subject’s unconscious desires, anxieties, pleasures, 
and so on, have taken the form of a hope.  
Deborah Britzman13 and K. Daniel Cho have identified the central importance of 
language, pedagogy, and subjectivity as three aspects of education and psychoanalysis which 
make them “intertwined, coterminous.”14 The unique involvement of language and knowledge in 
these two disciplines introduces a subject of both which renders the “Cartesian quest for 
certainty” impossible.15 Our only access to the psychic world of others is through the dual filter 
of language and experience; by our nature, humans must mediate their interactions symbolically, 
lacking as we are a direct psychic connection to the inner world of others.  
The subjective position of the teacher and the student—analogous to the relationship 
between the analyst and the analysand in a clinical setting—is a vexing one where knowledge of 
the self and the other are intimately linked despite the inability of the subject to fully assess their 
own knowledge or the knowledge of others. In education and psychoanalysis, to think is not to 
be and to be is not necessarily to think oneself as such. Our inability to know what others want 
from us creates anxiety and opens a space for the subject to imagine what it is the other wants. In 
my project, I will argue that it is in this gap between (mis)recognition of our own desires and our 
                                                
12 Žižek, Slavoj. The sublime object of ideology. London: Verso, 1989, p.4 
13 Britzman, Deborah P. Freud and education. New York: Routledge, 2011, p.3 
14 Cho, K. Daniel. Psychopedagogy: Freud, Lacan, and the psychoanalytic theory of education. New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.3 
15 Cooper xiii 
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(mis)recognition of the desires of the Other that neoliberal ideology gains access to our desires 
and shapes them into a fantasy-form for maintaining capitalism’s ideological hegemony: hope. 
It is my intention that, in seeking to understand the psycho-social causes and effects of 
hope in education that this project answer Žižek’s call for thinkers to develop theoretical “short 
circuits” in dominant or hegemonic concepts that “interrupt the smooth functioning of a network 
of meaning” and, in doing so, “[bring] to light its ‘unthought’, its disavowed presuppositions and 
consequences.”16 Identifying the primacy of hope in education is not itself novel; one need only 
read text in (critical) educational theory on the political or the cultural to surmise the strength of 
hope’s grip on educational philosophy. My goal is, however, that “the readers should not simply 
have learned something new: the point is, rather, to make [them] aware of another—disturbing—
side of something [they] knew all the time.”17 
In chapter one I discuss the form and function of subjectivity in some of the works of 
educational and political theorist Paulo Freire to understand their intimate connection to his 
project of hope. In this chapter my focus is on the limitations of Freire’s use of the Cartesian 
subject as a framework for understanding the subject in relation to hope and the political. In 
chapter two I outline Jacques Lacan’s theory of subjectivity and discuss how both the subject and 
their hopes find shape and substance only through immersion in ideological discourses. In this 
chapter I emphasise the importance of jouissance (enjoyment) in Lacan’s work and how it can 
help us understand how hope paradoxically propels and limits the subject. In chapter three I 
detail some of the limitations of the enlightenment project as represented in both political and 
educational philosophy and discuss possible alternatives to education projects oriented toward 
future hopes rather than present problems.  
                                                
16 Žižek, Slavoj. The parallax view. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, p.ix 
17 Ibid., ix 
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Chapter One: The Cogito of the Oppressed  
 
I. Hope and Subjectivity in Freire  
“There is no change without dream, as there is no dream without hope.” 
-Paulo Freire18 
 
 
Brazilian educationist Paulo Freire is perhaps the best example of a theorist of education 
who both understood the subjective nature of education and desired mass popular education as a 
vehicle for radical, (leftist) social change; as a political and pedagogical theorist of the subject, 
we ought not see Freire merely as a philosopher of education, but as a theorist and practitioner of 
all of Freud’s impossible disciplines. In his extensive and widely read books and essays of 
progressive, critical educational theory, Freire is often deeply concerned with the structure and 
function of hope in the educational subject. In his analysis of Freire’s understanding of the role 
of hope in education, Darren Webb goes so far as to argue that, “Freire’s entire philosophy of 
education was founded on his ontology of hope.”19  
Freire’s ontology of hope is conceptually bound to his educational theory with a 
subjectivity that he often described but did not explicitly name as a theory of subjectivity. Freire 
based his pedagogy and theory of the subject on the belief that hope and education were both 
rooted in “men’s incompleteness, from which they move out in constant search.”20 Born with all 
the worldly knowledge of a tabula rasa, the subject is born with an inherent lack, which 
necessitates a lifelong search for fulfilment. As social creatures, Freire believed that the human’s 
search for completion could not be endeavoured alone, writing that our search was one “which 
                                                
18 Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of hope: reliving Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum, 1994, p.91 
19 Webb, Darren. "Paulo Freire and ‘the need for a kind of education in hope’." Cambridge Journal of Education 40, 
no. 4 (December 2010): 327-39. doi:10.1080/0305764x.2010.526591. 
20 Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum, 2000, p.64 
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can be carried out only in communion with others.”21 Our shared lack and its concomitant 
collective need for satisfaction start us on a journey that for Freire is the very process of our 
becoming-human. “The incessant pursuit of humanity” driven by the subject’s incompleteness 
was not only the basis of hope for Freire, but the basis of our educability.22 Education obtains its 
political character through its structural position as a scene of our becoming, as a site where the 
raw materials of subjective hope and lack are transformed into consciousness. 
 
II. The Impossible Subject 
In his book Psychopedagogy, K. Daniel Cho argues that the model of subjectivity 
outlined after the theories of mind of René Descartes, the Cogito23, the subject that thinks (and 
therefore is) has deeply influenced education’s own models of subjectivity. The model of 
Cartesian subjectivity posited by the Cogito finds accordance in contemporary pedagogical 
praxis, including Freire’s, which emphasize and prioritize students’ cognition, how they think, 
over knowledge accumulation, what they know. The emphasis on cognition in educational 
practice is well captured in the educational cliché that teachers ought to instruct students not in 
what to think, but how to think—and, with the recent turn to metacognition in educational theory 
and practice, how to think about what they think. Descartes’ model of subjectivity stands 
opposed to classical European pedagogies and epistemologies that primarily emphasize the 
guided attainment of knowledge as an/the end of education. Central to the ontology of the subject 
of the Cogito is a self-reflexive gap between what the subject knows and their metacognition, 
what the subject thinks about what they know.  
                                                
21 Ibid., 72. 
22 Ibid., 64 
23 Stemming from Descartes most famous quotation “cogito ergo sum,” I think; therefore, I am (from Discourse on 
Method) 
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 The Cogito provides educational theory with a justification of the Enlightenment ideal 
that personal, social, and cultural progress is possible as individuals transform themselves 
through modes of thought superior to tradition and superstition. A project of mass education 
based on a Cartesian model of subjectivity provides hope that we are not doomed to remain as 
we are, both as individuals and individual members of socio-cultural groups; through the Cogito, 
we, as individuals and social beings, can reason our way through and beyond personal and social 
dilemmas. One of the axiomatic assumptions of Cogito-subjectivity is that there is a gap between 
what one thinks and what one is; the subject of the Cogito is an agent whose existence depends 
on their ability to curate the forms and contents of their thoughts and can in turn be transformed 
by them. In the Cartesian model of subjectivity, it is the fact that the subject relates agentically to 
what they know through reflective reasoning, not the content of the knowledge itself, which 
determines the subject’s being. As Cho notes, “the Cartesian model of doubt proves handy for 
creating a critical distance between the thinking I and its knowledge,”24 in that the subject can 
determine the veracity of their knowledge through reflection and doubt, and thus change their 
thinking, and themselves, according to the outcome of their reflection. The subject changes 
themself through critical integration of new knowledge or new doubts regarding their knowledge 
and by discarding out-dated or irrelevant knowledge— how the subject comes to discursively 
ontologize knowledge as relevant or irrelevant, true or untrue, will return later as a problematic.  
In this paper, I understand the limits of this interpretation of the Cogito as arising from 
within the very gap it enforces between what we know and who/what we are. It is no coincidence 
that the Cartesian model of agentic subjectivity dominates both the theoretical and practical 
fields of pedagogy/teaching, psychology (through theories and practices like cognitive 
behavioural therapy) and politics/governance (through theories of propaganda, opinion polling, 
                                                
24 Cho, 73. 
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voting one’s beliefs etc.). These three fields comprise what Freud called the impossible 
professions, concerned as they are with the abstract and unquantifiable realm of subjective 
transformation, “in which one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results.”25 The 
subject of these professions is one that can know itself, knowing what they know, knowing how 
they know it, and reporting this knowledge and meta-knowledge to others. In non-
psychodynamic psychotherapy, the therapist relies on the client to accurately report mental and 
emotional experiences, the cognitive patterns that influence them, and the material consequences 
of this interaction. In political and governmental research, pollsters rely on subjects to faithfully 
report their political perspectives and moral and ethical positions to discern how these affect their 
voting habits. The axiom of Cogito-subjectivity is that the subjects of these professions are both 
willing and able to disclose, to themselves and others, the objects of their thoughts and feelings 
and the subjective value of their knowledge. 
In the field of pedagogy, Cho argues that the standard interpretation of the Cartesian 
model of subjectivity functions well when students are confronted with curricular knowledge and 
epistemic schematics with which they are already comfortable. Learning that the sky appears 
blue during the day because of the inherent qualities of light is a mundane factum that ought not 
to trouble a subject’s sense of self or their worldview; in contrast, we need only to look at the 
reactions of a significant number of people to the science of anthropogenic climate change and 
the consequences of such (facts considered to be mundane by the scientific community) to see 
how new knowledge can provoke severe subjective reaction. The subjectivity of the Cogito 
begins to break down, argues Cho, when students are confronted with difficult or traumatic 
knowledge, with ways of thinking that challenge their existing epistemologies.26 Because the 
                                                
25 Freud, S.,  “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 18, 1937: 400 
26 Cho, 71. 
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Cogito necessarily links thought and being, to radically change one’s thinking is to change one’s 
being. Far from encouraging critical reflection and personal transformation, Freud argues that 
traumatic knowledge and experiences of confronting it are usually rejected, repressed, by the 
subject to maintain their self-consistency. For Lacan, the axiomatic assumption that our 
conscious thoughts maintain the subject’s sole agentic relationship to knowledge is a 
fundamental theoretical error of the ego-psychology: the psychological theory that the ego, or the 
conscious self, is the seat of subjectivity. Ego-psychology in one form or another dominates 
much contemporary educational and psychological theory.27  
 
III. The Subject’s Secret Sadness 
One of Freire’s greatest socio-political concerns is that the link between the subject’s 
desire for completion or fulfilment and their drive towards a communal, progressive political 
education was not at all a foregone conclusion. Freire’s fear for the subject of education was that 
their incompletion would lead them not towards fulfilment through conscientização,28 
consciousness raising and politico-subjective transformation, but to seek pleasures in 
consumerist materialism, commodities, or political ideologies that reinforced the materialism and 
consumerism of the capitalist status quo. Freire was prescient in his concern that neoliberalism 
and its ideological emphasis on self-improvement (in as much as one’s skills, abilities, and traits 
relate to their output as labourers), economic self-sufficiency and the concurrent destruction of 
the welfare state, socio-hierarchical advancement, and the privatization or elimination of social 
goods and state institutions, represent a grave threat to mass education and required an explicitly 
                                                
27 Ibid., 76. 
28 Introduced by Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
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political pedagogy to combat.29 Jacobs writes that Freire’s critique of neoliberal ideology, like 
the material effects of the ideology itself, extended into the classroom. Jacobs notes, per Freire, 
that competitive systems of hierarchical assessment and evaluation in education further shape 
student’s object-desires around the false promises of individualism and inspire a withdrawal 
from collective thought, action, and struggle.30  
Subjective despair in the face of the intransigence of neoliberal capital is the spectre that 
haunts Freire’s writing on the subject of hope. It is important to note that Freire described hope 
not merely as a desirable political or educational affect, but as “an ontological necessity”31 
without which educators and students would “succumb to despair” and “fall into stasis.”32 Hope 
in this sense constitutes an essential orientation and affect of the subject forced between a natural 
lack and a concomitant drive towards fulfilment. Without hope, the subject is no longer driven 
by the lack at the core of their being and will melancholically cease to pursue fulfilment through 
means outside of those forced upon the subject by capital.  
Jacobs’ argues that despair represents a threat to the subject because it introduces 
political inertia and is, as Freire writes, “a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from 
it.”33 This “fleeing from the world” means that the subject takes itself out of dialogue with the 
necessary social communion of pedagogy. The despairing subject no longer strives toward 
“completion” and in doing so, no longer strives toward the utopian political goals of the hopeful 
subject. A disciplined approach to critical thought and helping the student to move beyond mere 
critique of the status quo into direct political action was Freire’s prescription for avoiding facile 
or simplistic manifestations of hope that encourage students to rely on fantasies of intervention 
                                                
29 Webb, 331. 
30 Jacobs, 788. 
31 Ibid., 787. 
32 Webb, 329. 
33 Jacobs, 795. 
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of some deity or other-worldly power to end their political subjugation.34 Hope, for Freire, was 
what could drive students to see the future as lacking determination, and inspire them to imagine 
the future in a way that was not simply an ideological repetition of the present.  
 Even though Freire’s ontology of hope was thin on detail regarding acceptable or 
important objects of hope, Webb argues that Freire maintains the four qualities which are still the 
hallmarks of the archetypical philosophical conception of hope: situated in the near or distant 
future, moral and ethical goodness, difficult to obtain, and possible to obtain.35 Utopia is the 
problematically vague moniker of Freire’s ideal goal toward which the subject’s hope and the 
teacher’s educational projects should be directed. While Freire did not describe his utopian, 
future-oriented moral good in detail, he was careful to emphasize the aspects of his ontology of 
hope addressing the inevitable difficulty of attaining any such goal. Webb argues that Freire’s 
ontology requires a “non-acceptance” of reality that “is distinguished from impatient revolt by 
virtue of its humility, modesty, serenity, and security.”36 Freire argues that teachers should not 
wait with a “patient hope” merely so that they can endure the miseries of the present, but should 
instead seek to mobilize their students with passion and critical reflection.37 Pre-emptively 
countering any criticism of political passivity or an acceptance of injustice, Webb writes that 
such virtues should be tempered with courage, boldness, and endurance to challenge injustices 
not just with personal resistance, but with political action.38  
Freire’s understood hope as a necessary form of relating to self and other without which 
personal and political transformation are impossible; Freire knew very well that hope was 
                                                
34 Webb, 336. Even in the utopian, post-scarcity, post-capitalist, pro-humanist Star Trek universe (one of the best 
pop cultural examples of hopeful futurity) humanity was doomed to a slow extinction following a nuclear 
apocalypse until First Contact with an alien species sparks a sustained ideological, cultural, and technological 
renaissance.  
35 Ibid., 330. 
36 Ibid., 333. 
37 Ibid., 335. 
38 Ibid., 333. 
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necessary, but not sufficient, for political change, and that the subject must still agentically 
choose to take communal action to change material circumstances for themselves and others. The 
subject’s critical knowledge of their (more-than-likely) difficult material circumstance and the 
challenges they will surely face in attempting to change them is not theorized as an impediment 
in Freire’s work, but as another necessary condition of change. In his theory of hope, Freire 
maintains the essential structure of Cartesian subjectivity, with the understanding that despair is 
merely a form of (non) relation with the world. Despair, for Freire, is ideologically and 
discursively encouraged in students and teachers by institutions of the status quo and must be 
critically combatted by the subject—in other words, despair is a kind of doubt not in the 
subject’s knowledge, but in their image of utopia and their belief in the possibility of reaching it. 
Despair induces in the subject a sense of negative determinism, of melancholy, and thus denies 
agency to the subject.  
In Freire’s conception of the subject, hope is the fundamental link between the subject’s 
lack and their drive towards humanization, or the elimination of the lack at the core of their 
being.39 With a subject so structured, despair is a symptom of a political sickness introduced in 
the subject by their material circumstances and the determinism of the neoliberalized future. For 
Freire, it is hope above all other affects and perspectives that must be consciously cultivated by 
the subject to avert a despair-induced stasis, developed in the subject as a reaction to the material 
structures of capitalist ideological hegemony. Freire understands well the challenge of 
neoliberalism on a material level and on the level of socio-psychological despair in the conscious 
subject. Where Freire’s understanding of the power of the hope/despair dichotomy fails is when 
we consider the more insidious material, psychic, social, and cultural traumas of neoliberalism 
and their effect on the subject of the unconscious.  
                                                
39 Ibid., 327. 
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Fundamental to Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity is that there is an agency at 
work within the subject’s psyche beyond the ego, the conscious self: the unconscious. The 
unconscious is the psychic space in which repressed traumatic knowledge resides, beyond the 
subject’s awareness. For Freud, the unconscious is the true site of personal motivation and 
transformation according to the maxim that plays off the Cogito, “where it was, there I shall 
become.”40 With this maxim Freud means to argue that repressed traumatic knowledge or 
memories constitute an unconscious body of knowledge out of which the subject is formed, both 
through their object-interactions and their internal psychic life, and without the need for 
acknowledgment of the presence of such knowledge. Far from the image of critical self-
reflection and transformation posited by standard interpretations of the Cogito, the subject of the 
unconscious navigates the social world transformed by knowledge of which they have no 
awareness, but which is acted out by and through the conscious subject. Psychoanalysis as 
outlined by Freud, and later Lacan, provides a model of subjectivity which considers this alien 
“other side” of knowledge, thought, and being resting just beneath the conceptual bridge between 
the shores of thinking and being. 
While Freire’s theory rings true in its enticing fantasies of powerful revolutionary 
archetypes resisting the poisonous influence of bourgeois ideology, his reliance on the subject of 
the Cogito and his implicit ontologizing of hope as necessarily morally good causes him to miss 
how hope can potentially work as a greater source of political inertia than despair if it is co-opted 
in/by capitalist ideologies. Freire’s assumption is that the subject is able and willing, through 
critical self-reflection, to confront capitalist ideology and their subjective desires and fantasies 
which stem from such reflection and in doing so avoid stasis in despair. However, if Freire is 
correct, and that the inertia of despair in the subject is the fruit of capital, then why do capitalist 
                                                
40 Cho, 75. 
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subjects seem to be so animated, to enjoy capitalism so thoroughly? In my next chapter I will 
discuss Lacan’s theory of the subject to examine how a subject so thoroughly repulsed by their 
life-world can, nonetheless, be both enthralled to its maintenance.  
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Chapter Two: On Dutiful Jouissance 
 
I. (Enjoy) Your Self 
“The dreams remained the old dreams…and they turned into the ultimate nightmare.” 
-Slavoj Žižek41  
 
In psychoanalysis, to say that the subject is is deeply problematic. For Lacan, the subject 
is not equivalent to the self, the thinking self of the Cogito, but is an existential void around 
which an imaginary and symbolic identity is constructed. In Lacanian theory, the Imaginary, the 
Symbolic, and the Real are the three interconnected and interdependent registers of psychical 
subjectivity. The Imaginary represented the primarily visual and experiential core of the 
subject’s unconscious. Adding to the terms with which Freud argued the nature unconscious in 
terms of trauma, Lacan conceptualizes the unconscious as being made of “imaginary fixations 
which could not be have been assimilated to the symbolic development” of the subject’s self.42 
Images and experiences that cannot be symbolized, that cannot be integrated by the subject into 
their experiences, is itself the definition of trauma in Freudian psychoanalysis.  
Though the unconscious is a place of Imaginary fixations, Lacan also argues that it is 
structured like a language. The language of the unconscious is not like a communicative 
language as such, but it does function as a site of symbolic mediation. For Žižek, the Symbolic 
order is “a formal order which supplements and/or disrupts the dual relationships of ‘external’ 
factual reality and ‘internal’ subjective experience.”43 The register of the Symbolic refers to the 
spoken and unspoken socio-symbolic norms and regulations of all societies. The Symbolic is the 
                                                
41 Pervert's Guide to Ideology. Directed by Sophie Fiennes. Performed by Slavoj Žižek. Unites States of America: 
Zeitgeist Films, 2012. Digital Download. 
42 Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Freud's Papers on Technique 1953-1954. Translated by Jacques-
Alain Miller. Book 1. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.159 
43 Žižek, 1989, 13. 
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register that confers and regulates meaning in symbolic communication and determines for the 
subject the medium of their interactions with their self and the Other.  
The only aspect of the subject that can be said to have substance, the only aspect of the 
subject that can truly be said to exist outside of images and symbolism, is the subject’s 
jouissance, their enjoyment.44 Jouissance represents the register of the Real in Lacanian theories 
of the subject. The Real is that which cannot be imagined or experienced directly nor can it be 
symbolized in language or other means of representations. As an aspect of reality that defies 
representations, the Real disrupts all attempts to form complete symbolic systems of 
representation. The Real exists in excess of phenomenal reality but does exert a disruptive causal 
influence on it by inserting a negativity into the registers of the Imaginary and the Symbolic.  
The Imaginary and Symbolic identities of the subject are structurally necessary in 
psychoanalysis and in the realm of psychic relations (both to the self and to the Other), but are 
contingent on each subject’s lived experience. As an aspect of the Real, the subject’s experience 
of jouissance is not contingent on their individuality; each subject’s Imaginary and Symbolic 
identity will contingently organize their enjoyment, but that they will seek out enjoyment is not 
contingent on any particular identity. Whereas Freud once believed that the pleasure principle 
dictated that subjects will seek out pleasurable experiences, over time he theorized that subjects 
were, in fact, driven by a principle beyond pleasure and contrary to their own good.45 This drive, 
the so-called death drive, compels the subject to unconsciously and repeatedly seek out 
pleasurable experiences in ways that are detrimental to the subject’s self-interest and are 
experienced by the subject as excessive and even painful.46  
                                                
44 Ibid., 73. In this paper, jouissance and enjoyment will be used interchangeably.  
45 Copjec, Joan in McGowan, Todd. The end of dissatisfaction?: Jacques Lacan and the emerging society of 
enjoyment. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004, p.5 
46 Wells, 49. 
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The subject’s introduction to jouissance and its organization, the logic of how each 
individual subject enjoys, arrives in and through their primary relationship and first love object: 
their caregiver.47 In responding to the child’s many needs, the caregiver allows their own 
unconscious jouissance to disturb the psychic stasis of the child.48 While the relationship 
between the caregiver and the child exist prior to the child’s entrance into language (the infant 
communicates through physical and pre-verbal responses to the caregiver) the child has no way 
of knowing exactly who their caregiver is, what it is that they want, and cannot communicate 
directly with the caregiver about what they themselves want. In their inability to assimilate the 
unconscious desires and enjoyment (or lack thereof) of the caregiver the child becomes so 
anxious that it is forced to ask itself “What does the other want from me? What am I for them?”49  
For Lacan, this traumatic experience of the impenetrability of the desire of the other 
creates such anxiety that the child’s psyche necessarily creates imaginary answers as a defence. 
These imaginary answers represent the birth of fantasy/ies in the subject. The child’s answer to 
the desire of the Other is called by Lacan the fundamental fantasy: an enjoyable but imaginary 
explanation for the enigmatic desire of the other that protects the subject’s psyche from the 
traumatic anxiety of ignorance which the subject is otherwise unable to discharge.50 Although the 
fundamental fantasy protects the subject from the trauma of ignorance, its birth in anxiety lends 
the subject’s jouissance a perpetual quality of unease or even pain—very much in the spirit of 
having too much of a good thing. The knowledge of one’s own ignorance of the desires of the 
other is deeply repressed into the unconscious. This repression is glossed over by fantasy and any 
                                                
47 In Lacanian theory the primary caregiver is referred to as the Mother. However, the title of Mother is merely a 
continuation of Lacan’s “return to Freud.” The role of the Mother is a structural one and need not be fulfilled by the 
subject’s actual mother. As such I will refer to them simply as the subject’s (primary) caregiver.  
48 Wells, 47. 
49 Ibid., 47. 
50 Ibid., 48. 
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attempts to provoke an awareness of this knowledge are inescapably painful, resisted strongly by 
the subject so that they may continue to find some semblance of enjoyment in them.51 
It is important to emphasize that the fundamental fantasy serves the subject as a 
protective answer to a question that not only cannot be answered by the subject, but indeed does 
not have an answer at all. The subject’s failure to interpret the Other’s desire is not a prematurity 
in a child’s symbolic reasoning, it is a necessarily-missed opportunity for intersubjective 
recognition that the Other “is not actually the master of [their] acts or words” and that the 
meaning and organization of the Other’s enjoyment is unknown to both the subject and the 
Other—it is unconscious.52 For Lacan, this moment of misrecognition not of one’s self, but of an 
Other, cements the unconscious in the realm of the social and renders the structure of subject 
fundamentally intersubjective; the subject cannot exist without the promise of enjoyment in the 
Other. In this intersubjective stance, both the subject and the Other are defined by a lack: the 
subject lacks an answer to the enigma of the Other’s desire, and the Other itself lacks this 
answer.53 This is perhaps the most traumatic revelation of Freudian psychoanalysis: that no one 
possesses the secret to the final satisfying desire because there is no such secret, there never has 
been, and there never will be. 
It is the intersubjective nature of fantasy and lack that allows and teaches the subject to 
desire, preparing them for entry into the social network of symbolic relations. Until the subject 
enters the socio-symbolic world, they imagine themselves to be fulfilled and without lack; the 
fundamental fantasy provides a satisfying answer, however false, to the mystery of the Other’s 
desire. Though this fulfilment is fundamentally a lie, the fantasy provides the subject with 
excessive jouissance—the subject enjoys the satisfaction of a moment in time where they do not 
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desire or feel the urgency and anxiety of unfulfilled desires. My emphasis on the imaginary 
aspects of the fundamental fantasy should here be taken quite literally. The fundamental fantasy 
is, above all else, a specular image imbued with a feeling of deep satisfaction.  
The excessiveness of jouissance stems from its position as the lacking aspect of an image 
or fantasy or object of desire that provokes the psychical existence of the image/object itself in 
the subject. An excess of jouissance is an extra-linguistic drive, an imperative-feeling, beyond 
symbolic meaning, which exerts great influence on and over the subject. Lacan called this object-
cause of the subject’s desire the objet a. The objet a is not itself imaginary in that it exists in 
excesses of the subject’s fulfilment in fantasy, which was and is, of course, illusory. The objet a 
represents the lack of an answer to the enigma of the Other’s desire; it is present in our fantasies 
and mental images only in that its absence from them conjures our desire for them and the 
objects in which it is imbued. The objet a is the unconscious cause of both conscious and 
unconscious fantasies produced by the subject’s psyche as an answer to the enigma its absence 
provokes.54 In its absence, the objet a causes our desiring of objects and our fantasy images of 
our object relations55 but it remains unconscious and is not itself represented as an object of 
desire. While the subject may describe their conscious desire for a specific object (an expensive 
computer, an attractive lover etc.) or their fantasy of finding satisfaction in their relation to an 
object (emotional fulfilment in a romantic relationship with a specific person) , the objet a is not 
itself that fantasy-object; the objet a is the object cause of desire in the subject for objects, but is 
not itself a material object. Lacan describes the objet a through the Greek concept of the agalma. 
The subject is merely a worthless box containing a hidden gem, the agalma.56 The objet a is an 
                                                
54 McGowan, 19. 
55 Object relations in psychoanalysis includes what we would normally consider interpersonal relationships. 
56 Lacan, Jacques. The ethics of psychoanalysis: 1959-1960. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by Dennis 
Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. 
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immaterial object which exists in excess of the material object desired by the subject. Being in 
excess of material objects means, of course, that the objet a is eternally elusive and thus no one 
object can bring the subject the enjoyment they unconsciously seek in it. 
Entry into the social world outside the subject’s primary relations introduces them to a 
brand-new range of Others in whom they might potentially find enjoyment. The Others of the 
social world are both material, as in actual people, and abstract, as in social codes and 
conventions which the subject may experience as familiar or well-known but are nonetheless 
Other to them. Everyone and everything that exists outside the subject is Other to them—and, as 
we will see, even those objects internalized by the subject are Other to them. Being 
intersubjective, the foundation of the subject’s fundamental desire is the same as it was before 
they entered the symbolic world of language; in the symbolic structures of language and social 
relations the subject continues seeking an answer to the enigma of the Other’s desire, to the 
jouissance of the Other. The intersubjectivity of the social world pushes the subject to seek their 
illusory satisfaction in Others and thus creates a powerful and enduring psychological bond 
between them.57 
 As the subject ages and enters into the social world of language, bringing with them their 
existing psychic world of images, feelings, and imaginary jouissance, the jouissance organized 
by the subject around their fundamental fantasy is abandoned in order to adapt to a realm of 
social relations; the toll for entry into the social realm is that the subject reorganize their 
jouissance into, and according to, socio-culturally contingent symbolic relations and their 
regulations (the Law, cultural mores, moral and ethical imperatives, acceptable objects of desire 
etc.)58 As Lacan wrote, “jouissance is prohibited to whomever speaks...since the Law is founded 
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on that very prohibition.”59 In order to find social comprehensibility, the subject finds itself 
bound to a forced choice of total social alienation by refusing the meaning-structure of their 
society, or alienation from their enjoyment. After their entrance into language and the Symbolic, 
the subject now finds their fantasies, desires, and enjoyment organized according to the 
“institutional unconscious” of their inducted society and will be driven to seek, or commanded 
not to seek, enjoyment in ideologically structured ways.60 McGowan argues that the imaginary 
does not exist “outside of or prior to the symbolic” and that the two are complimentary, with the 
imaginary world of fantasy finding shape based on the structure of the symbolic.61  
The problem of the unconscious, jouissance, and the objet a, for Freire lays in the 
distance between the Cogito and the subject of the unconscious. The subject of the Cogito fits 
nicely with Freire’s undetermined utopian vision; as a subject who can self-direct both their 
desires and actions, the subject of the Cogito is the ultimate political actor. For them, the 
marginalising forces of neoliberal capital are wholly external while conscious, subject-shaping, 
political visions of a better future are held internally. The problematic aroused by the 
unconscious is an introduction of internality to the desires of capital and an externalising of the 
desires of the subject. Unlike the self-determining subject of the Cogito, the subject of the 
unconscious is a small vessel with a lacking hull, battered about by the visible waves and unseen 
currents in an ocean of ideology.  
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II. Hope and the Political Unconscious 
In The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology, theorist Slavoj Žižek analyses the political message 
of the song “Officer Krupke” in Bernstein and Sondheim’s West Side Story. In the song, the 
characters perform a fantasized interaction with Krupke, a local police officer. The substance of 
the song is a series of rationalizations for the group’s frequent criminal mischief. A broad range 
of sociological and psychological issues from parental abuse to unbearable boredom are cited as 
psycho-social determinants of the group’s behaviours and outline the material circumstances in 
which the group members are forced to operate. While the tone of the song is cheerful and self-
aware, the substantive issues sung about in the song reveal a miserable situation of genuine 
hopelessness. The youth's situation of hopelessness, however, has not engendered any kind of 
psychic or social inertia; the group continues to delight in their delinquency much to the 
confusion and frustration of symbolic authorities (police, judges, parents, and so on). The young 
delinquents seem to enjoy their state of despair.  
The youth in West Side Story display not a despairing withdrawal from their hopes for a 
better life nor an explicit adoption of the values of capitalist consumerism; hopelessness has not 
sapped them of their will to live or to struggle against their circumstance.  Their hopelessness 
and disillusionment with the so-called better life offered to them by capitalist careerism have 
been sublimated into the substantive ideal offered to them by the failure of their integration into 
either form of hope: resistance to their offered social forms and material conditions. Žižek uses 
the paradox posed by the delinquents in West Side Story as an analogy for the London riots of 
2011. Lacking a clear political or ideological motive, Žižek argues that widespread theft during 
the riots was a consequence of the protesters having been symbolically determined solely as 
consumers, as subjects of dominant ideological paradigms who are driven by both the desire for 
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material consumer goods and the symbolic status they endow. The contradiction born of such a 
consumerist ideology amongst economically marginalized youth is that they lack the social 
mobility and material wealth to legitimately obtain the goods they are taught to desire and value 
so highly. In other words, as neoliberalism slowly renders traditional liberal-democratic ideology 
obsolete, it replaces the object ideals of sociality, equality, and justice with those of pure 
individualist consumerism—psychically, neoliberal ideology replaces political and social goals 
with personal desires for wealth and status.62 
 The alienation which motivates the youth from West Side Story illustrates the 
contradictions at the heart of subjectivity introduced by a socio-cultural shift from what Todd 
McGowan terms a society of prohibition to a society of enjoyment. In The End of 
Dissatisfaction?, McGowan argues that prohibition, the social and symbolic enforcement of 
forbidden objects, serves as the foundation of social relations, “demanding that subjects sacrifice 
enjoyment for the sake of work, community, and progress.”63 In a society of prohibition, subjects 
are not entitled or expected to seek out fulfilment of their desires or discover unsanctioned 
avenues of enjoyment. McGowan relays a common sentiment—a sentiment that is all too 
familiar to educators—in the ideologies of societies of prohibition and societies which stem from 
them that a subject who is enjoying themselves or is in pursuit of their own desires is not 
productive.64  
  In a society of prohibition, the subject’s discomfort in their awareness of their own lack 
is compounded in the sense that they are prohibited by the symbolic dictates of their social 
systems from satisfying their desires, or in most cases even pursuing satisfaction of their desires. 
McGowan’s argument mirrors Lacan’s in relation to the alienation of the subject in language; the 
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subject’s access to jouissance is sacrificed in a forced choice in exchange for the benefits of 
intersubjectivity required for entry into the symbolic. No matter the prohibition, the structure of 
the subject wins out and their drive toward satisfaction expresses itself in a medium bound to, 
but outside, the constraints of the symbolic: the imaginary. For the frustrated or dissatisfied 
subject, there are two available avenues of action: rebellion against the prohibitive symbolic 
order, or acquiescence to the status quo, living in a state of denial of their original sacrifice of 
jouissance. Absent a spirit of rebelliousness, the subject instead prefers to imagine that “we 
haven’t made the initial sacrifice of enjoyment or that we are able to overcome this sacrifice and 
enjoy within the social order” (18). In a society of prohibition, the subject’s imaginary “[houses] 
the image of the denied enjoyment” and allows the subject to keep calm and carry on, so to speak 
(19).  
As Žižek argues in Pervert’s Guide to Ideology, a capitalist society of prohibition creates 
a perverse duty to the circulation of capital. In inevitable times of recession, subjects are 
expected to renounce their personal desires and concede to regimes of austerity and a duty 
toward capitalist economic systems, “and for this duty anything can be sacrificed.”65 As Lacan 
argues, the imaginary is not a psychic space of total freedom; it is intimately connected to the 
symbolic structures in which the subject exists and which forms the horizons of what the subject 
can imagine.66 Though the subject may find enjoyment in the imaginary, this enjoyment 
continues to occur within the symbolic constraints which shape the subject themself and who 
usually remain ignorant that such constraints exist even in their wildest imagination. Perhaps the 
most devastating sacrifice capital demands from us may be not the loss of our freedom, but the 
loss of our very ability to even imagine ourselves as free. 
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III. The Society of Enjoyment and a Society of Hope 
Lacan gave the name Law to the quality of the symbolic order that prohibits the subject’s 
enjoyment either inside or outside of that order.67 Since the subject’s jouissance is a structural 
consequence of the split between the conscious and unconscious mind, the symbolic Law is 
incapable of eliminating the drive towards jouissance. Instead, the Law demands that the subject 
internalize its own prescriptions and prohibitions for accessing jouissance. Though the Law is 
primarily a prohibitive socio-psychological force, the drive of the subject’s jouissance remains 
immensely powerful; jouissance remains the subject’s primary concern in both their relations 
with itself and with Others. After entering the world of the symbolic, the subject’s enjoyment is 
organized such as they are now driven to find enjoyment in what they are denied. The superego, 
both Freud and Lacan’s name for the internalized imperatives of the Law, now elicits the 
subject’s enjoyment in the form of an obscene command, an “unconditional injunction”: enjoy!68 
The society of enjoyment however, transforms the notion of duty emphasized by the 
society of prohibition from one of renunciation of enjoyment, desires, or personal pleasures, to 
one of a responsibility to Others to enjoy ourselves both for our sake and for theirs. This trend 
can most easily be seen in the discourses of what Lacan termed ego-psychology, the dominant 
towards which mainstream (non-psychodynamic) psychology in the United States drifted during 
Lacan’s life.69 Ego psychology has, in recent years, taken a turn toward positive psychology: a 
psychological perspective which argues that enjoyment, rather than dissatisfaction, is the 
baseline human psychological state. Dennis Prager argues that happiness and enjoyment, which 
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were personal concerns in the society of prohibition, become a moral obligation under a society 
of enjoyment.70  
Under the dominance of the internalized Law—the Freudian superego—in the society of 
enjoyment, we are never distant enough from the Other’s enjoyment. Where once we could find 
respite in various social prohibitions stifling the imperative to enjoy, in the society of enjoyment 
you find only a persistent social duty to do so. We are surrounded by enjoyment; surrounded not 
only by actual others and their enjoyment, but by images, symbolic media and other near-
constant reminders of their enjoyment. Žižek argues that when enjoyment becomes obligatory, 
the demands of the superego, the internalisation of symbolic imperatives, generate a psychic 
state in which the subject is never satisfied. While the subject is commanded to enjoy, it is not 
ever able to feel that it has enjoyed itself sufficiently. The superego imperative to enjoy creates 
in the subject a cruel guilt, which drives it to repeatedly seek out new sources of enjoyment, 
always unsure that any one source provides enough of it.71 The repetitive seeking out of new 
enjoyment is sustained perfectly by the problem and the small piece of the Real, which originally 
grounded the subject itself: the jouissance of the question “what does the Other want from me?” 
For Freire, neoliberal capital (being within a society of enjoyment) creates either misery 
or provides subjects with false images and values that support only the continued flow of capital. 
On first glance it would seem that Žižek’s analysis of the delinquents in West Side Story would 
support Freire’s arguments on hope and subjectivity. Neoliberal ideology has indeed co-opted 
the students’ drive towards humanization with personal desires for enjoyment in commodities 
and mischief. The youth, however, do not seem to be miserable or to have taken up the offers of 
legitimate enjoyment offered by a long and productive suburban life. Not only have the group 
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members found a kind of communion in their socio-economic self-awareness, they hardly seem 
to be stuck, unmoving, or hiding from the world as Freire predicted. Dramatically prescient self-
knowledge of their social and material circumstances has not frozen these youths or forced their 
withdrawal from the world, but has instead motivated their withdrawal from a certain version of 
their world, a certain organization of meaning and enjoyment. Žižek argues that this paradox, 
that “they know very well what they are doing, but they are nonetheless doing it,” is a material 
manifestation and psychic consequence of neoliberal capitalist ideology.72 Unlike the 
misinterpreted subject of the Cogito, for whom self-knowledge ought to be transformative, the 
subject of the unconscious is shaped by the paradox of knowing better, but not knowing they 
know better, or refusing such knowledge, and thus behaving as if they do not. Consequently, the 
subject of the unconscious resists strongly any use of new or transformed knowledge to change 
the subject.  
According to McGowan, cynicism pretends to know the secrets of the Other despite the 
fact, of course, that there are no such secrets. The cynic wants to avoid the naiveté of the desiring 
subject; it refuses to allow any point of potential enjoyment to be unknown to them and therefore 
within the cycle of seeking and failing to enjoy sufficiently. However, argues McGowan, “this 
triumph over non-knowledge does not transform the subject or its situation.”73 The cynic 
believes that they can transcend symbolic mediation and directly access the secret of the Other, 
the ideological motivation behind the command to enjoy. The cynic refuses to be caught in the 
symbolic network, forgetting that this network is what gives their lives, their entire frame of 
reference, any meaning.  
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The cynic thus attempts to rebel against the symbolic through acts of defiance. The 
meaningfulness of this defiance, however, is an obvious dupe. The symbolic simply absorbs 
rebellion against it as to rebel is to acknowledge or create an investment in the meaning against 
which one rebels. “The cynic stages their act publicly in order that symbolic authority will see it” 
in turn legitimizing the perspective of the big Other, the symbolic guarantor of meaning.74 If 
knowledge and self-reflection on one's social and political circumstances is the progressive goal 
of education, and the cynic can claim they already have the necessary knowledge, and yet they 
—and their circumstances—do not change. Enjoyment and movement against the constraints of 
prohibition keep the youth enthralled to petty rebellion, but what keeps the uncynical beholden to 
their determined social and psychic coordinates? 
According to McGowan, our ability to discover an alternative path depends on our ability 
to understand and interpret the present, not our capacity to imagine the future. Our thought 
cannot arrive at the future bypassing the present; we must be able to recognize the status of the 
subject in our time before we can change it.75 Freire conceptualized the political fight in 
education as being between two dichotomous subjective states in relation to their material and 
ideological condition: one of politically static ignorance and one of politically active conscious 
awareness. Freire’s proportion of concern for the quantity of neoliberal capital’s effect on our 
social, psychic, and political lives, but his worry was merely that the specific qualities of 
neoliberal capital would keep the subject ignorant or would alternatively force upon them 
perspectives and values which serve only itself. Neoliberal capital’s promotion of symbolic 
system which prioritize the values of individualism, self-promotion, and rejection of collectivity 
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are, however, merely surface concerns when we consider the ideological effect of neoliberalism 
on the subject’s enjoyment.  
The challenge to Freire’s theory of subjectivity I have described here is not so much one 
critique of his courageous vision for popular political education, but one of a deep concern for 
how we understand the subject of these political changes. Like the post-soviet Marxists who 
expressed their disillusionment with the working class as the natural revolutionary subject, I 
worry that the subjectivity imagined by Freire is not as it seems. The natural subject of the 
revolution was one driven by class consciousness to fight against theory class-enemy in a war of 
economic interests. Just as Marx once did, Freire did not consider that self-interest might be 
overridden by enjoyment in those objects which are not our own, which do not help us achieve 
our interests. As an educator, Freire concerned himself with what the subject knew or could 
come to know with time and effort; what he seems to have overlooked is what the subject does or 
can do with what they know and, perhaps more importantly, what they do not know they know, 
and what they refuse to know.  
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Chapter Three: Indifference and Repetition 
 
I. Half Truths and Whole Lies 
If we assume the position taken by Heidegger when he argued that truth is not a 
“correctness or correspondence” with a metaphysical reality but the revelation of something 
hidden or distorted, then we are left with difficult questions concerning the ontology of truth.76 If 
the truth is a revelation, then what is revealed? If we accept that what is revealed is an object that 
corresponds to some metaphysical reality, then a notion of truth as finding what is hidden is 
merely a formality. Perhaps an even more troubling situation involves the productive capacity of 
hiding. If a hidden truth, distorted or covered with a lie, begins to shape not just our perception 
of the truth, but our social reality itself, then what effect will its revelation have—if any? Here, I 
want to explore some of the implications of parrhesia, the conscious revelation of difficult truths, 
as discussed in Maria Tamboukou’s Truth telling in Foucault and Arendt: parrhesia, the pariah 
and academics in dark times in relation to Žižek’s readings of critique of ideology and 
psychoanalysis in The Sublime Object of Ideology. In working with Žižek’s definition of 
ideology as the symbolic structure of our material reality, I hope to bring into question the use of 
parrhesia and consciousness-raising as effective tools for shaping the nature of knowledge and 
truth in the politics of dark times; how can we best use parrhesia in the age of cynical politics, a 
time when the educational project of the enlightenment has transformed into a dystopian post-
modernism where each of us is entitled to their own truth and lies are no longer secrets. 
 For Tamboukou, it is the role of the academic to criticize, to speak truth the power, to 
bring about “understanding [of] complex truth games through which practices and discourses are 
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scientifically validated and become dominant.”77 What Tamboukou seeks to establish with the 
adoption of parrhesia as an academic duty is not new “valid knowledges” with which we can 
replace untruths but to uncover “the material conditions and fierce power relations at play 
through which ‘dominant truths’ and ‘master narratives’ are constituted and established.”78. For 
Tamboukou, with each truth told, with each process of truth construction deconstructed, the 
pretence of the supposed truth becomes weaker and thus the liar’s position is weakened as well. 
A fundamental aspect of parrhesia, and of Heidegger’s understanding of truth, is a certain lack of 
knowledge on the part of both the person to whom the truth is told as well as the People who 
have had the truth distorted or hidden from them. For Tamboukou, the revelation of truth objects 
(a parent revealing to a child that Santa is not real) is far less important to politics than ensuring 
that the People understand how they come to know and live according to such untruths (a 
Marxist revealing to the child’s parents that it was not love but capitalist jouissance that 
motivated them to perpetuate the lie of Santa Claus). Parrhesia as an unveiling of a dangerous 
truth presents us with a serious theoretical and political problem: anyone who lived during the 
Red Scare knows very well that the emperor has no clothes. Žižek argues that simple 
‘unmasking’ narratives in relation to ideological critique fails to understand the psychoanalytic 
implications of truth-telling.79 All the emperor’s subjects are perfectly aware that the emperor 
has no clothes; no one misrecognizes the situation in which the emperor finds himself except for 
the emperor. The more radical truth here would be if a subject dared to question why all the 
People were so terrified to tell the emperor of his naked state.  
For Žižek, a better example than the “emperor” metaphor of how dominant narratives 
distort not only our perception of reality but also reality itself is the old joke “somebody points to 
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a woman and utters a horrified cry: look at her, what a shame, under her clothes she is totally 
naked!”80 The truth of the woman’s nakedness is overlooked by all who see her because she is 
indeed clothed; her clothes are merely a cover for the startling reality of her born-nakedness. 
This fetishistic denial, of how when we interact with one another we do not imagine the other 
person to be naked under their clothes—or to vomit, to shit, to spit when they speak—our 
perception is strikingly (perhaps thankfully) limited by ideological distortion. “The mask is not 
simply hiding the real state of things; the ideological distortion is written into its very essence.” 
The trouble with parrhesia as imagined by Tamboukou is that the emperor’s ignorance of his 
nakedness can indeed be corrected with a harsh truth; the truth reveals an unseen reality. The 
problem of hope and enjoyment is that, in the joke about the clothed woman, the people are 
totally aware that under her clothes she is naked. The people know they, like the woman, are 
naked beneath theory clothes, but they live as if they are ignorant of this reality.81  
The trouble with a parrhesia grounded in revelation is that our fundamental social fantasy 
is unlike the simple false consciousness imagined by Marx. The so-called End of History arrived 
after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1991, marking the victory of liberal capitalist democracy over 
Soviet-style socialism/communism.82 No longer would the world be split by two totalizing 
ideologies struggling for the subjectivization of hearts and minds. Socialism had for nearly a 
century forced capital’s subjects to tarry with the spectre of Marx, openly debating and explicitly 
outlining the ideals of liberal democracy for those not yet convinced. The curricula of capitalist 
education systems could ill afford a coy presumption that students would recognize capitalism’s 
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superiority over socialism; the correct choice was inevitable, obvious, and socio-culturally 
(en)forced, but was acknowledged as a kind of choice nonetheless—capitalist and workers were 
encouraged to fight on the side of capital against the spectre of revolution. After the End of 
History, the dominant narratives of capital, like the Devil himself, pulled off a fantastic trick: 
they convinced the world that grand narratives did not exist.  
Žižek’s understanding of truth and ideology as inherently elusive disrupts the liberatory 
possibilities of a politics of parrhesia. Fundamentally, parrhesia works on the level of 
knowledge; per Žižek, however, ideology functions both on the level of knowledge and as “a 
fantasy structuring our social reality itself.”83 The subject of ideology is no longer an ideologue, 
but an astute and cynical consumer of narratives. A revelation involving a hard truth, a criticism 
of the assumptions of the Other is unlikely to convince them that the underlying structures of our 
social and cultural reality themselves constitute that reality. This cynical distance from dominant 
ideologies, this misrecognition of their role in shaping our lives is the very mechanism that 
allows them to reproduce—like shared ignorance, uncomfortable truths go unthought, at least 
consciously. Žižek argues that if the ignorance of the People truly resided in knowledge and not 
in action, then parrhesia would be incredibly effective as a political tool; political subjects would 
harbour no illusions as to the nature of their social and cultural worlds.84 
The world of shattered illusions that widespread, duty-bound parrhesia would usher in 
represents the collapse of the realm of symbolic and approaches the realm of the unsymbolizable, 
noumenal, Real. For Žižek, ideology serves as a mask for antagonisms inherent in any 
symbolically mediated system.85 As before, misrecognition of these antagonisms is crucial to the 
reproduction of ideology: no symbolic system is ever capable of fully representing the object 
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reality it claims to capture, but the system cannot function effectively if this is both known and 
acted on by its subjects. The trouble with parrhesia is that it offers the subject no illusions, only a 
traumatic encounter with the rock of the Real on which ideology stumbles in its efforts to capture 
and shape reality. Like the truth offered to us by Heidegger, the Real is not a substantial thing, its 
existence —if we can agree that it exists at all—can only be found retroactively in the effects 
that it causes. For Žižek, the most important of these effects is the objet a, a “pure void which 
functions as the object-cause of desire.”86  
In his book Violence, Žižek discusses the dystopian social landscape described in the 
novel [and film] Children of Men. The film’s drama centres on the social and cultural 
consequences of sudden, incurable, and universal infertility in humans. Žižek argues that the film 
is not about the biological inability to reproduce but rather the collapse of “great passion [and] 
commitment” in a post-political age.87 While infertility arouses the spectre of the apocalypse, of 
the possibility of living as the humans on Earth, Žižek argues that political infertility (see the 
United States Congress under President Obama) in our post-political era moves us in the 
direction of Nietzsche’s Last Man, the model somatic citizen of Huxely’s Brave New World. The 
Last Man are radically risk averse; “tired of life” they seek only “comfort and security” and are 
totally “unable to dream.”88 The Last Man “renounces ideological causes” and “what remains is 
only the efficient administration of life.”89  
The fundamental role of ideology is to fill in this void with some vacant signifier; 
freedom, love, wealth, success, can all serve as ideologically shaped objects that capture the 
desire of political subjects. The objet a is the carrot, and the Real is the stick. The renunciation of 
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ideological causes would seem to be an ideal conclusion to a program of parrhesia. Without the 
illusion of truth perpetuated by ideology we would finally be able to shape the world honestly, 
according to our given material conditions. Even if this satisfaction were possible, as Žižek notes 
in Pervert’s Guide to Ideology, “desire is always also a desire for desire itself.”90 The sublime 
nature of the objet a requires that we circulate around it in perpetuity. To approach the object 
would have two consequences: the first is that we would realize the false idealism of the object 
and find that it is only a regular, vulgar thing and not the impossibly fulfilling object of our 
desires. The second consequence is somewhat more troubling. As the objet a functions as an 
object cause of desire, for it to collapse would be a collapse of not just a specific desire but of 
desire itself. The collapse of ideological edifices in The Children of Men was not the end of 
ideology, but the end of the fantasies that support ideologically interpolated reality—without a 
future for humanity, those still living would face a radical crisis of subjectivity that would force 
them to reform their most fundamental fantasies. The satisfaction promised by parrhesia is both 
impossible and represents an undesirable cessation of desire for those still fully within ideology. 
In other words, as neoliberalism slowly renders traditional liberal ideology obsolete, it replaces 
the object ideals of sociality, equality, and justice with those of mere life, an ostensible non-
ideology, a pure injection of objet a.  
Consumerism is the ideal object of cynical ideology. Just as neoliberalism encourages 
subjects to identify with only themselves, consumerism positions the idealized object not as one 
specific object, but as the act of consumption itself. A life consisting of the potential 
consumption of anything is the means through which the subject is promised the infinite pleasure 
of total libidinal satisfaction—any objet a can be yours for a series of low monthly payments. Of 
course, if the idealized object is not itself a material object but rather a performative act, then 
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ideality is projected onto nothing—a truly impossible object—and desire’s promised satisfaction 
is endlessly deferred; Freud’s reality principle tests the promised satisfaction against the actual 
psychic satisfaction of consumption and, consciously or not, finds it wanting.91  
Tamboukou’s proposal for a parrhesiastic duty falls in line with a concomitant duty to 
listen to others when they speak difficult truths to us. She writes that teachers and academics 
have “extra responsibilities” in sustaining critiques of harmful ideologies even as they shape 
reality against such a possibility.92 While Tamboukou’s focus on parrhesia is a political one, I 
hope to have demonstrated the philosophical and psychoanalytic barriers to its effectiveness as a 
tool for widespread psychic, if not political liberation— I hope only that I have made an effective 
argument and not that my pessimism is well grounded. Despite these barriers, one of 
Tamboukou’s minor arguments opens opportunities to advance the project of parrhesia on a 
smaller scale: Foucault’s link between logos and bios. Foucault believed that parrhesia was, in 
particular, a project of self-reflection where the truth-teller brought him/herself in line with the 
“true life” or the life lived in the shadow of the parrhesiastic duty.93 While it may be impossible 
to restructure or replace the fantasies that determine our commitments to ideological structures, 
we may be able to change the ideals to which the ego can adapt itself— this is to say, provide an 
aesthetic that can be followed even within an indomitable ideology.  
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Žižek proposes such an aesthetic solution when he outlines a broad pedagogical and 
ethical project where we must “draw a line of distinction within the very field of our dreams 
between those that are the right dreams, pointing to a dimension effectively beyond our existing 
society, and the wrong dreams, the dreams that are just an idealized consumerist reflection...of 
our society.”94 The dreams that Žižek refers to are not simply self-made; we give assent to 
dreams that have been imposed on us by our social, cultural, and economic order from birth until 
death. Žižek’s agentic subjectivization of our dreams is offering us a chance to “become realists 
by way of demanding what appears to be impossible in the [ideological] domain,” to reflect on 
the objet a we are presented and perhaps to replace it.  How then are we to escape the infernal 
cycle of ideological manipulation? Žižek proposes a pedagogical example in the form of direct 
passive experience of the end-result of capital production. Žižek believes that scenes of 
“apocalypse,” in films or in places like airplane graveyards in the Mojave desert, allow us to 
experience what Lacan called the “inertia of the Real,” what Žižek calls “a mute presence 
beyond meaning.”95 Žižek is describing a passive agentic experience where we can witness, 
outside of its proper (symbolic) functioning, the breakdown of our system of production; to see 
the reality of our waste, and the consequences of our desires, we must see the resulting material 
products outside of their utilitarian and socio-cultural meanings. In other words, to look upon 
Capital’s works and despair.  
Žižek’s moment of passivity stands in contrast to the active emancipatory efforts put 
forward by Freire and critical pedagogues like him. Far from simply doing nothing, casting aside 
ambition in the face of difficulty, Žižek argues that the doing-something of emancipation is not 
inherently emancipatory. Frantic movement through a hedge-maze of inconceivable enormity 
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may feel emancipatory but it does not necessary bring the subject closer to the exit. A moment of 
refusal to participate in the maze running allows the subject to take stock of the nature and scale 
of the challenge facing them. Moments of passivity and refusal can allow the subject to consider 
the conditions that seek to overwhelm them, to interpret their nature, and to consider their 
relationship to them. This is not a suggestion that the subject trapped in the maze should simply 
sit, starve, and die; it is a suggestion that the subject fully come to terms with the reality that they 
were born to play a game not designed to be won by consciously choosing the conditions upon 
which they will play the game.  
II. Eyes Forward, Looking Back 
“I never watch the stars, there’s so much down here” 
-Lorde, Yellow Flicker Beat 
 
The problem of hope is that, as a utopian, future-oriented vision, the subject is 
encouraged to imagine the future as lacking in determinism but does not itself present a solution 
to the problem of imaginary enjoyment in the false determinism of capitalism. As a source of 
imaginary enjoyment, hope is but merely another avenue to jouissance within the otherwise 
miserable structural and material elements of life under capitalism. The future orientation of 
hope as a speculative and specular fantasy endows it with two constituent problems: the first is 
that, as an image of a social life-world, economy, and so on, which is (imagined to be) better 
than the subject’s current one, they can conjure jouissance where their material circumstances are 
not able to provide it for them. This specular enjoyment is, far from a vehicle for progressive 
social change, a source of inertia even more troublesome for its implications to political progress 
than the inertia of neoliberal capital. The second problem is that hopeful images and fantasies are 
based constructed entirely with the images and symbolism already available and familiar to the 
subject of capital themself. The symbolic structures of capitalist ideology have so limited our 
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imagination as to make it nigh impossible to imagine a world free of it. The problem of available 
imagery under capital is the reason Žižek asks us “why is it easier to imagine an end to all life on 
earth than a modest change to our economic system?”96 Any hopeful image of a future without 
the oppressions of capital we might conjure will inevitably be built on a foundation of neoliberal 
capitalist ideology. Freire himself expressed concern over the presentist emphasis of 
neoliberalism arguing that “the dominators have nothing to announce but the preservation of the 
status quo, they continually strive to domesticate the future and render it merely a repetition of 
the present.”97 The challenge for Freire’s hope is that ‘the dominators’ have not domesticated the 
future, they have domesticated what it is possible for the subject to imagine in the present and 
rendered hope, as a future oriented affect, inert.  
Contextualizing the notion that the Law, the external and the internalized symbolic 
structure of the subject’s life-world, shapes and directs even the subject’s inner-most images and 
fantasies, Charles Wells writes in The Subject of Liberation that “the Law has no power on its 
own and must therefore find a way to turn desire to its own purpose.”98 Symbolism and imagery 
alone are insufficient to compel the subject to action. Thus, the subject’s desires are shaped by, 
amongst countless other symbolic structures, the Law of neoliberal capital. We enjoy our hope in 
capitalism because no other symbolic system on offer promises an/the answer to the enigma of 
desire. For Freire, writes Webb, “progressive education is conceived as an inspirational process 
through which the educator seeks to mobilize the [student] with a dream...through which the 
impossible, by the strength and conviction with which it is dreamed and announced, becomes 
possible.”99 In dreaming, in teaching, and in doing, Freire asks us to transgress against the 
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boundaries and limits imposed by capitalist ideologies in order to break through to the enjoyment 
of achieving our progressive utopian vision. Freire is right in that hope and transgression is a part 
of who we are, but this hope is not, as he believes a source of freedom; Freire’s hopeful 
subjective position is, in the Lacanian sense, a perversion.  
Wells argues that when the subject is faced with conflict between their desire, perhaps a 
hopeful utopian desire, and the structures of the Law, the pervert attempts to act on their desire 
and “assumes that there is no obstacle to desire outside of the various socially constructed Laws 
that structure human interaction.”100 While Freire was careful to ground his notion of utopian 
hope in some kind of empirical understanding of material reality101, his notion of the hopeful 
subject depends on a belief that they are able to transgress and thus transcend the Law in order to 
access a reality beyond imaginary and symbolic representation, an unrepresentable reality 
beyond the strictures of capitalist ideology—in Webb's interpretation of Freire, “to announce a 
utopian vision that defies positive representation.”102 Contained within the self-contradiction of 
announcing a vision which cannot be described is an invitation to the structure of the hopeful 
subject to view the act of hope itself as a transgression of the Law which initiates action toward 
emancipation; the pervert enjoys transgression and thus finds the prohibited jouissance in hope. 
Grounding one’s vision of a noumenal utopian future in a materialist-phenomenal interpretation 
of the present is precisely analogous of the very the limits placed on the subject’s imagination by 
neoliberal ideology and is not a theoretical solution to them.  
The pervert’s folly is that this enjoyment in transgression is inherently imaginary and is 
easily integrated into the Law itself. One need only look at the Hope and Change promised by 
Barack Obama during his 2008 run for the Presidency to see how hope provided an initial burst 
                                                
100 Wells, 28. 
101 Webb, 331 & 335.  
102 Ibid., 337. 
 
 
 44 
of transgressive enjoyment and the action/promise of a change to, and from outside of, the 
Law—as a black man in a deeply racist nation, Obama’s desire and active intention to be 
president was an iconic transgression of American socio-symbolic structures. How quickly this 
hope turned to apathy and despair as the political energies of Obama’s supporters were absorbed 
and dissipated by an intransigent political system and the promised change never materialized. In 
a political context more familiar to Freire’s time, Žižek argues that it was the dreams of leftist 
political leaders that brought them to the ultimate transgression, revolution against the Law. 
Once they had succeeded in, and enjoyed, their revolution, Žižek argues that their old dreams did 
not change or adapt to the new situation. The Law was not destroyed, merely dormant within the 
leaders’ political imaginaries. Once the new Law was established, as it is structurally required to 
be, “the dreams remained the old dreams and they turned into the ultimate nightmare,” ending in 
the abject failure of every leftist political revolution in history.103 Freire writes that, “We need 
critical hope the way a fish needs unpolluted water.”104 We need the dream of a utopian futures 
to survive. What he forgets is that, while the fish may need unpolluted water, what if the entire 
ocean is polluted? What if our very dreams are not the place of freedom we imagine? 
 
III. Hope in the Future Tense 
The challenge of Freire’s belief in hoping for and setting out to create a utopian future 
“without form”, a utopian project of action without a determined vision of its final form, is made 
clearer by the ontological and materialist arguments of Annette Baier in “The Rights of Past and 
Future Persons.” Baier sets out an argument that future persons, people who do not yet exist but 
the fact of human procreation demands will almost inevitably exist eventually, have a claim 
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against the living for some general rights. Baier justifies her claim analogously, arguing that it is 
conceptually consistent for social and legal institutions that recognize the rights of the no-longer-
living to also recognize that the yet-to-live might also have interests that place obligations on the 
living.105 Qualitatively distinct from the rights of the dead, the rights of future persons would not 
be specific rights based on the deceased person’s will (speaking both existentially and legally) 
but would instead be general human rights to the necessities of life (clean air, water, soil, etc.).106 
Baier argues that, unlike rights intended for the living, rights of future person’s need not be based 
on the undetermined roles or identities of those future persons. Determining these roles, writes 
Baier, is both pragmatically impossible and conceptually unnecessary as we can safely imagine 
that the physiological needs of future generations will not differ significantly from our own.107 
According to Baier the obligation on the living to ensure future generations’ access to these 
rights is grounded in the fact that the rights represent natural demands of human existence and to 
ignore them would be to threaten that existence. Baier frames the rights of future persons as the 
ontological and metaphysical basis for the rights of the living—if our rights cannot ensure 
sustainability of access to those rights, then they are not rights at all.108 
Baier is less committed to arguing that future persons have an absolute and enforceable 
right to the institutions (broadly defined) of the living than to her argument for their general 
human rights. Baier employs a broad historicism in her debate on a moral right to social 
institutions noting that such rights would be only morally justified—as opposed to formal, legal 
ones—and might “commit us more than may be realistic or wise to fixing the details of our 
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moral priorities in advance of relevant knowledge that only history can provide.”109 Despite the 
difficulty in claiming absolutely which rights future persons can assert in the present, Baier 
argues that as “especially self-conscious members of a cross-generational community” we have 
the ability (scientific and philosophical) and duty to predict the consequences of our 
contemporary action —or inaction—for future generations.110 More so than ever we have the 
strength of hindsight and foresight to reasonably debate which social goods are not simply ours 
to consume in the present, but, morally, should be passed on to future persons.111 Baier argues 
that future generations can claim we are obligated to maintain our institutions through our ability 
to know the original intention of the institution’s creators for them to be cross-generational 
‘goods,’ as well as our ability to predict that they may be as important in the future as they are 
today. The obligation placed on us now, perhaps more than any previous generation, is one 
stemming from both the past and the present.112 
 Baier’s task for the living, to consider the basic needs of those who will come after us, 
obliges us to do, quite literally, the bare minimum to ensure to continued existence of the human 
population. It should come to the more cynical or misanthropic among us then as no surprise that 
we are failing at even this basic task. The rapid decline of the welfare state in favour of 
neoliberal aristocracy was something that Baier, writing in the American economic boom-time of 
the 1970’s, was unable to foresee. Baier’s own (perhaps misplaced) optimism serves as an 
excellent example of the very ethical challenges she describes in her essay. The temporal shift in 
thinking that Baier asks of us, from considering only the demands of the past on the present, 
towards obligations on the living on behalf of future persons is a social, cultural, and 
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psychological one which demands that we, the living, construct a world that serves the imagined 
interests of those who do not exist, and whom will live in socio-cultural conditions that we 
cannot necessarily predict empirically. Despite these impossible conditions, the future person 
demands both social and psychic representation.  
 In “the Difficulty of Imagining Other Persons,”113 Elaine Scarry argues that individual 
and collective cruelty towards Other persons stems from a lack in the human inability to imagine 
them as whole, feeling persons. Scarry argues that our failure of imagination regarding the Other 
is not limited to ethno-racial Others but can also be expanded to explain our injurious relations 
with the other persons who are closest to us. Scarry argues that our perceptual inability to fully 
imagine Others, as well as our more intimate relations, is tied intrinsically to a prior, constitutive, 
epistemological flaw. In this vein, she writes that “our injuring of others, therefore, results from 
our failure to know them; and conversely, our injuring of persons within arm’s reach, itself 
demonstrates their unknowability.”114 Not only do our injurious actions demonstrate our lack of 
knowledge of the Other, but also that people, by their nature as subjects, cannot be known. 
Baier’s concern for futurity places our epistemological inabilities in a double-bind: not only is 
the Other, future person unknowable, the nature of the future is itself unknowable. The 
inconceivability of the future person, argues Scarry, has resulted in a political deadlock where 
“we are as a population almost empty of ethical worry about the future.”115 Unlike the ancient 
Romans, as described by Baier, who were ignorant of the destructive consequences of their 
slash-and-burn “forestry management” techniques, denizens of the present are either unaware of 
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the anthropomorphically driven decline of the biosphere or simply lack any ethical concern for 
the consequences of that decline for future persons—an option as worrying as it is likely. 
 Both Baier and Scarry suggest several normative political techniques that can help the 
living compensate for their fundamental lack of imagination. In “Imagining the Future”, Baier 
asks us to imagine a temporal space inhabited by imaginary but inevitable virtual persons for 
whom we act, politically, in the present: these future persons can be represented by an actual 
person living in the present who advocates for their rights on their behalf. For Baier, liberal 
politics is a forum where the consequences of present actions for future persons can be debated 
in the framework of those persons’ present rights. To ensure that the living are respectful of the 
limited rights of future generations, Baier suggests that there be an agent, or agency, chosen to be 
responsible for enforcing the fulfilment of obligations that those rights place on the living.116 
Like a parent who is legally responsible for the safety and well-being of their child, we are asked 
to serve as an agent who is duty-bound to enforce the rights of future children. I believe that 
Baier stumbles quite accidentally on the politico-ideological technique that most closely 
resembles the perverse contemporary instantiation of our imaginative lack regarding future 
persons. Baier’s reasoning on the socio-cultural and political aspects of intergenerational goods 
and on the necessity of a representative of the future in the present opens a political and 
epistemological moment where the child of the present becomes the Child of the Future. 
 
IV. Present Effects of a Future Child  
In No Future, Lee Edelman imagines politics not as a presentist system with eyes towards 
the future, but as an ostensibly adaptive system that is fundamentally conservative, working to 
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“affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it intends to transmit to the future…”117 
Edelman argues that, in our psychic and cultural imaginary, the formulation of futurity is 
embodied in the image of the Child. For Baier, future persons are virtual others on whose behalf 
we act in the present. Future persons will eventually become actual and our relation to them as 
objects of thought, through our actions in the present, will determine the material conditions in 
which they live in the future—and the meaning of our actions on their behalf will be understood 
historically by them. We do not need to fully imagine them aside from imagining that their basic 
physiological needs will be the same as ours.  
The Child’s role in the symbolic order is different from the future person in that they are 
not a signifier for the deferred-but-eventual subjectivity of an actual future person—we have 
named the future person to comprehend their function symbolically, but their actuality, their 
subjectivity, exists only in the abyss of the Real future. The Child exists as a teleological cultural 
justification for maintaining the existing social order now and always; the Child is the fully-
imagined-future for whom—or which—our social order and its contingent social goods are “held 
in perpetual trust.”118 The difference between the Child and Baier’s future persons is one of our 
relation to them in the present. The Child is a symbolic staging ground of our self-realization, 
onto which those in the present project the impossibly perfect image of a desired future that will 
never, and can never, become actual.119 
 The Child is no actual, specific child, past, present, or future, on whose behalf we act 
politically. For Edelman, the Child is merely an image, endowed with conservative symbolism, 
that enables a political ideology of reproductive futurism: “an ideological limit on political 
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discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privileging of heteronormativity” by 
position the image of the child as “the fantastic beneficiary of every political intervention…the 
perpetual horizon of every acknowledge politics.”120 In Baier’s politics, the future person is a 
virtual rights bearer who places obligations on us to consider them in our political decisions 
specifically as they relate to actions that might infringe those rights. The rights of Baier’s future 
persons are limited both in number and scope. In Edelman’s thinking, the Child is the hegemonic 
justification for politics, full stop; each of our political deliberations and decisions must be 
understood under the symbolic authority of the Child—inversely, the image of the Child gives 
symbolic authority to those who invoke it, who claim themselves as its spokesperson. In 
positioning the Child as the end of politics, reproductive futurism externalizes those whose 
thinking is external to the Child. The image of the queer is the ultimate externality in the politics 
of reproductive futurism as their procreative lack embodies the end of the Child and therefore 
destroys the future—the queer embodies death in and of the social order. 
 Edelman’s Child returns us to Baier and Scarry’s challenge of knowability. For Baier, the 
unknowability of future persons’ subjectivities was an obstacle to knowledge of which social 
goods can or should be preserved for future generations but not an obstacle to preserving the 
necessities of life. For Edelman, analysing our political relations through Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, this unknowability is a fundamental, but hidden, constituent of the image of the 
Child. Edelman argues that politics serves as the symbolic framework in which we (attempt to) 
enact the fantasies of order we achieve in our adoption of totalizing Imaginary subjectivities; in 
other words, to understand, to know, Others as subjects in a social reality, we must submit to a 
fantasy that is structured by absolute and complete images that are supported by linguistic 
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structures.121 In this way, we can recognize the meaning of our political reality by filtering it 
through the symbolic authority, structured by impossibly perfect images, of the Child. Social 
reality and the subjectivities that make it up demand meaning. Something meaningless cannot be 
explained or integrated into our symbolic understanding of the world. The Child, as our image of 
the future, is the symbolic answer to the question of meaning. Why should we build enduring 
institutions? Why should we regulate social behaviour? Why does what we do matter at all? 
Why do I exist? If we ask, where are we going? then the Child is the answer. For Edelman, the 
Child is the perpetually deferred destination of history, the end of our narratives of progress.122 
This is what it means for the image of the Child to signify the future: the Child gives our actions, 
our very lives meaning. As Edelman writes, “no baby…no future.”123 
 The difference between future persons and the Child is here, I think, clear: The Child 
never arrives. The laws of time demand that it always be the present, and that we may only know 
the past, however imperfect that knowledge; the future is as Imaginary and unknowable as the 
Child. Our insistence on identifying with the future, argues Edelman, is an attempt to hide from 
the death drive.124 Because our subjectivities are signified in a linguistically defined symbolic 
order, according to Lacan, there is an element of our humanity that can never be truly 
represented in that order; this is what Edelman means when he describes the Child as a grounds 
for our self-realization.125 The death drive is what exist as a surplus to our subjectivity and forces 
us to endlessly repeat our actions in the symbolic order in a futile attempt to fully symbolize 
ourselves. The Child is the image of the future in which we have finally achieved this impossible 
fulfilment, that we may live, though dead, forever; our utopian political desire of fulfilment and 
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of perfect links between meaning and actions drives us to deny that history is a cycle of 
repetition, a permutation of the same social order, and assert it is instead a chain of progression 
with an eventual End. Baier both accepts and encourages the endless cycle of repetition by 
attempting to enforce a right to the material conditions that would allow such a repetition to 
continue. Baier advocates for the ongoing existence of humans who, in their own time, must be 
allowed to create political and social meaning. In doing this, Baier finds peace in the death drive, 
comfortable in the knowledge that all must die, and insisting that those doomed to die allow 
future persons the same opportunity. The cult of the Child denies this repetition aggressively by 
attempting to re-create, in perpetuity, the unsustainable and metaphysically baseless material and 
philosophical conditions of the present. 
 For Edelman, the queer subject, imaged as unable to contribute to the eventual 
competition of humanity to be found in the future Child, is violently excluded from the social 
and political order. As a symbol of death, the queer subject insists on the importance of the 
present person over the figure of the Child. While the surplus and lack in the subject are 
symbolically determined and are unavoidable, the modes of repairs attempted in politics are 
diverse. Quoting Lauren Berlant, Edelman writes that the United States, a nation (at least 
narratively) founded on liberty for adult citizens, has become simply a support structure for the 
endless development of the Child.126 The conservative characterization of gay men as child 
predators who threaten the innocence and pure development—through the constant threat of 
recruitment in the cult of (the) death (drive)—of the innocent children contains, for Edelman, the 
stain of the Real of queer identities. Regulations designed to protect children are often the most 
oppressive limits on liberty that exist formally in the law. For no reason would it be acceptable to 
ban books, censor television and film, and shape politics in the image of the heterosexual nuclear 
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family other than for the protection of the children; a reason that is only explicit in the godly 
justifications of those most resistant to the realities of the drive. Such is how the same political 
actors can forbid abortion using the language of protecting children and, in the same breath, 
advocate for destruction of the welfare state that supports them materially. The Child exists to 
provide an avenue to perfection but need not, and cannot, provide it. 
 We can see now that the love and hope of a teacher towards their students is not one of a 
professional to their client, but one of an adult to a child in the cult of the Child. The subjectivity 
of the teacher—even if we do not consider the contingency of the existence of teaching as a 
career—is dependent on their ability to figure to importance of education as towards perfection 
of the Child. The nonsensical refrain of “educating for the future” permeates education. Here, I 
believe, is where a political intervention a la Baier can take place. In our political imaginary, the 
Child has colonized the future. In the Child’s name we are eradicating the possibility of 
sustaining human life on Earth at a pace where recovery becomes exponentially less likely, or 
possible, over time. To preserve the right of future persons to exist as well as build a world that 
is suitable, if not good, for the living, I believe our political focus should settle in the present.  
 Implicit in Baier’s argument is that a kind of ideality in the present is a guarantor of the 
basic elements of the good life for future persons. Eschewing the perpetual deferral of the good 
life offered by the cult of the Child, a politics of the present—but not of presentism—offers us a 
political horizon that can be touched instead of simply imagined. It is noble to act politically with 
an eye toward the future, but our bodies remain, always, in the present; like Baier, I argue that 
our unique historical position, as those who can better see the causes of our effects, demands of 
us “new moral relationships and new obligations.”127  
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We cannot know the future, but we have the power to affect its material conditions in 
ways our ancestors would find inconceivable. We know what we are doing but we are 
nonetheless doing it. Edelman argues that queer people have a unique position outside the social 
order and therefore a unique ethical obligation to it a la Žižek: to negate it.128 Following Lacan, 
Edelman’s desire is for queer people, or their political allies, to insist on the truth of despair even 
if it denies us the hopeful promise of an eventual Good, even if it hurts. In a typically queer 
injunction, Edelman writes that when a political actors attempt to delimit debate with a demand 
to “please think of the children” we should reply: “Fuck the social order and the Child in whose 
name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie [a child who sings that happiness is only (always) 
a day away]; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both 
with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that 
serves as its prop.”129  
 
V. Help Me, Subjective Destitution; You’re My Only Hope 
 If we are to follow Edelman’s suggestion to say ‘fuck it all’ to the images and symbolic 
systems that keep subjects docile, and we accept that exposure to harsh or traumatic truths is 
counterproductive, how can the subject move beyond the inertia of hope? Freire’s suggestion is, 
as before, that the subject form a political consciousness that does not accept the determinism of 
the future suggested by conditions of the present. Freire believes that it is hopefulness that 
prevents the subject from falling into despair and withdrawing from the world. Only in hope can 
the subject develop the consciousness they need to avoid the pitfalls of neoliberal ideology and 
the individualistic, egoistic subjectivity it demands.  
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The role of hope in the classroom and the difficulties in addressing it as an educator can 
be read in the context of Lauren Berlant’s theorization of hope in Cruel Optimism. For Berlant, a 
cruelly optimistic relation to an object occurs when attachment to that object compromises the 
conditions of satisfaction promised by that object.130 The cruelty of such an attachment exists in 
the form of a hope that in sustaining one’s relationship with the object “provides continuity of 
the subject’s sense of what it means to keep living on and to look forward to being in the world” 
(Berlant 24). Furthermore, the subject’s fear of losing the object hides a worse fear that losing 
the object will forever bar the subject from feeling optimism about anything again.131 A relation 
of cruel optimism is easier for an outsider, a teacher or analyst, to see than the subject of the 
desire themselves. Despite the ease with which a relation of cruel optimism can be observed, 
breaking that relation has the potential to destroy the subject. 
 I believe that the adolescent idealization of consumption and its repetition in the 
neoliberal classroom is just such a relation of cruel optimism. The ideal of consumption promises 
endless satisfaction that, by definition, requires endless consumption and thus will never come. 
The conditions of attachment to idealized consumption are the very barrier to the satisfaction it 
promises. The frustration of consumption demanded by the reality testing teacher is not only a 
momentary interruption, but a denial of the possibility of ever finding satisfaction. Even if we 
deny that the achievement of satisfaction in consumption is impossible, on a material level we 
are again confronted with frustration. The nature of our planet as finite is an existential 
frustration to the ideal of unending satisfaction in perpetual consumption. Despite this material 
reality, the cycle continues. 
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Here I fear that the solution is cruel, deeply lacking in optimism. Britzman argues that if 
Freud’s reality principle works as a pillar of education then the love lost by the ideal object must 
be dispersed onto new objects lest the capacity for love also be lost.132 On the compulsion to 
repeat, Britzman also notes that the loss of love and anxiety over (potential or actual) failures in a 
child’s education are traumatic moments that scar the subject’s psyche forever. The loss of love I 
am proposing in disillusioning students of their hope is a severe one: since their hope is 
determined by the same ideological and socio-cultural pressures that determine them as subjects 
in the world, to lose their love for consumption is also to lose their love for the world. 
 What is the cost of reorienting oneself to a world disavowed? How should education help 
students construct a relation to their world when the prohibitions and laws that are supposed to 
“provide a screen for the death drive” invite the drive in and demand that you enjoy the ride?133 I 
cannot help but see this analysis as an instance of “a matured primal scream,” an admission of 
helplessness that, like the adolescent who cries out for utility in knowledge, informs my ethical 
imperatives as a learner and as an educator.134 Onto whom, or what, should the transference send 
the learner’s love after it is lost by the world? I fear that the question of the loss of love in 
disillusionment has severe consequences if it is not handled with great care, for love is always 
also a kind of hate. The same man who said, “at the risk of seeming ridiculous, let me say that 
the true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love... our vanguard revolutionaries must 
idealize this love of the people...”135 also is reported to have said “a revolutionary must become a 
cold killing machine motivated by pure hate. We must create the pedagogy of the paredón 
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[execution wall].”136 Such a pedagogy might seem melodramatic in the context of an outwardly 
positive affect such as hope, but I believe that making explicit the violence in such an ideality 
can help us build a screen that shields us from the crueler effects of our enjoyment—a 
translucent shield that allows (in)sight but also provides protection. Certainly, there must be a 
pedagogy that can help us craft a screen for the death drive of hope that is not always also 
covered in blood —or advertisements. 
My position on the role of education, hope, and subjectivity take the form of what I have 
come to affectionately call a ‘classic Žižekian reversal’ of Freire’s argument. As I have argued, I 
believe it is hope, and not despair, that represents the inertial force maintaining the subject’s 
position in the psychic and socio-cultural status quo. Freire believes that despair freezes the 
subject and encourages them to disengage from the political and material world. Like an animal, 
the subject is at their most volatile, their most dangerous, when they have been backed into a 
corner. The corner is not a place of hope; it is the ultimate place of despair. In the corner the 
subject is forced to acknowledge that all the defence mechanisms that have led them there have 
failed and they again must make a choice: fight or die, or hope and die anyway.  
When the subject lives their entire life in the corner, hope is merely the name we give to 
denial, repression, displacement, projection, and sublimation when they are painted by capital 
with the smug grinning face of Wal-Mart’s Rollbacks mascot. When one’s entire life is lived in 
the corner, as Shakespeare writes in Measure for Measure, “The miserable have no other 
medicine but only hope.”137 Contrary to hope celebration as an agent, or at least precursor, of 
change, hope is the salve of the unchanging.  
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There is a sublime cinematic moment present in many films where the characters face a 
truly impossible threat. This moment inevitably comes toward the end of the film after the 
characters have spent the better part of two hours in frenetic motion, fighting or fleeing the 
threatening object. When the characters are cornered, when they have nowhere left to run and no 
will or weapons with which to fight, there is what I would identify as a moment of authentic 
passivity. The moment may play out in various ways, but the classic variant is a tearful hug 
between two characters, or a group hug or huddle between more. In this moment, the characters 
face the true horror of their predicament: after all their frantic action, after expending all their 
material and emotional resources, after fleeing an enemy they thought they could outsmart, they 
have changed nothing. It is in this moment that the characters finally acknowledge that their 
situation is as hopeless as it always was, but they refused to acknowledge as such.  
The problem of education can be seen in how the next moments of the film play out. In 
most films, but in children’s films especially, this moment of authentic acceptance of despair is 
interrupted by a deus ex machina where a hero thought dead or some other saviour rescues the 
characters from their fate. This moment of salvation, while often satisfying, is a moment of pure 
denial, of an abject refusal to bear the terror of the characters’ situation. In our cultural 
imaginary, education is just such a hero. What I argue, however, is that there is no such hero. 
The moment I wish to emphasise in such films is the one in which there is no saviour, in which 
no external force intervenes to save the characters. In these films the choice is stark, it is not 
whether they will fight or die, it is whether they will die fighting. In such moments, the 
characters’ authentic despair turns not into pathetic surrender to the inevitable nor into a 
redeeming affect producing an overcoming of the impossible, but into a rage against the 
absurdity of their situation. It did not have to be this way, but it is.  
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Like the structures of fantasy and desire that make hope a psychic possibility, despair is a 
constitutive element of our subjectivity. As McGowan paraphrases Freud’s belief in the 
possibility of happiness, “common human misery is the best we can hope for.”138 For Lacan, 
alienation and a despairing anxiety are fundamental parts of what we are. Our forced choice upon 
entering the symbolic world is the birthplace of fantasies of a former subjective completion that 
never were and never will be. It is for this constitutive reason that misery, and not hope, is the 
component with which we ought to identify. The subject “knows” that the world is not as it 
should be, or at least could be, but they reject this knowledge; knowing threatens their 
enjoyment. The despair felt by those who know is not, and should not, be discarded as a 
deadening weight, as an inertia to be overcome.  
Cho argues that, “we cannot assume a social investigator can access society’s dark 
underside and learn its traumatic knowledge without showing any resistance to it.”139 Even 
though the subject resists strongly the negative affect of political consciousness, even though 
they consciously attempt to maintain a hopeful outlook despite reality, even after we are 
conscious (in the Freirean sense) of our symptomatic misery, why does the subject not renounce 
it? Žižek argues that even after we discover the meaning of our repressed knowledge, how the 
subject can integrate what they have repressed into symbolic knowledge, we live as if we do not 
know. As Žižek says, “[the subject] loves his symptom more than himself.”140 The sinthome, 
what remains of the symptom after interpretation, is how we organize our enjoyment, how we 
“choose something” to “avoid madness.” We love our sinthome more than ourselves because it is 
central to our existence while the self is merely contingent. Our misery is killing us, but it is “the 
only thing which gives [us] consistency.” “The symptom is an element which causes us a great 
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deal of trouble, but its absence would mean even greater trouble: total catastrophe.”141 Once we 
are able to identify with our misery as our only substance, as the very core of our being, the 
promises of hope and happiness fall away and though we can never truly see reality for “what it 
is”, we cannot ever look beyond the vale of imagery and symbolism to the Real beneath it, we 
can look upon it with new eyes and a new attitude: I’d rather die twice than die once. 
The withdrawal of the subject from their symbolic life-world, a kind of death of the self, 
was called ‘subjective destitution’ by Lacan. Subjective destitution does not destroy the subject, 
as the subject is merely the void around which the self is formed. Subjective destitution leaves 
the withdrawn subject basking in the abyss of freedom and doubt, shedding the makeshift 
fantasy-answers to the original question that provoked the fundamental fantasy, and began the 
process of integration into an imaginary and symbolic life-world.142 Wells argues that in order 
for the subject to be able to free themselves from the cycles of desire and enjoyment demanded 
by neoliberal capital, they must make a conscious decision not to believe in the demand of the 
symbolic order of their life-world.143 Mirroring the ethical position of Bartleby the Scrivener, 
subjective destitution requires that the subject meet the demands of the Other with a simple “I 
would prefer not to”.144 In this position of active passivity, of agentically choosing not to engage 
with the material world within the symbolic coordinates set by neoliberalism, the subject is able 
to avoid the traps of fulfilment and enjoyment falsely promised by the symbolic as a reward for 
constant, unthinking, action. Like Žižek’s earlier aesthetic proposal to passively reflect on the 
material waste produced in capitalist economies, Bartelbian withdrawal from the subject’s life 
world opens up a space where they can “[withdraw] from the externally imposed system of Law 
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and its superego supplement [the injunction to enjoy] into...the space within which it is possible 
for the subject to re-choose [their] own fundamental fantasy.”145 While the structure of the mind 
in psychoanalysis requires the existence of both conscious and unconscious constructs like the 
fundamental fantasy and the imaginary/symbolic, subjective destitution introduces an 
opportunity for the subject to conscious orientate themself toward the symbolic world through an 
unforced, unalienated, choice.  
In terms of the relevance of subjective destitution to education, Wells argues that the 
teacher must adopt what Lacan termed the “discourse of the analyst” and serve as the Other who 
provides a “particular kind of silence” to the students demands for fulfilment, for instructions on 
how they should behave and what they should know under the gaze of the Other.146 The student 
of the analytical teacher will invariably demand knowledge, demand to be told what to do, what 
to think, how to feel. They will say they have not come to school to be a subject of the analyst, 
but to be subject to the master. As most teachers can attest, students want to be free of the 
school’s constraints and the teacher’s control just until they are. The questions which every 
teacher whose instructions allow too much discretion, who gives their students too much 
freedom of thought and action are invariably expressions of anxiety regarding the teacher’s 
desire: but what should I be doing...what do you want me to be doing…can you bear me doing 
the wrong thing? As Britzman writes of Freud’s perspectives on education, “there is no 
preparation for existence.”147 In refusing to answer students, in refusing to provide them with a 
closure of the antagonisms inherent in their subjectivity and in their symbolic world, the teacher 
forces the students into “the open, radically free space of subjective responsibility.”148 Wells is 
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also careful to write against the total silence of the teacher who, in refusing to say anything, 
imitates the subjective position of the students and refuses to take responsibility for their beliefs 
and decisions. The ‘objective’ teacher who claims to hold no political views merely rejects 
responsibility for influencing their students. Teachers must, “as it were, lead by example; not 
only to analyse and deconstruct [their] students’ immersion in their respective life worlds, but 
also to show them what it is like to take subjective responsibility for having chosen a particular 
perspective.”149 
The role of the analytical teacher is not to offer students hope for the future despite the 
present, or even conscientização, in the hope of offering such hope; the role of the analytical 
educator is to offer the students a choice in orienting themselves to the present. In 
conscientização, Freire offers the vital affects of humility, modesty, and serenity, as well as 
courage, boldness, and endurance to students and teachers struggling for a better world. Though 
these remain vital, even admirable affects to embody, for Freire, they merely contribute to a 
political and future-oriented hope. Analytical teaching grounded in the Reality of despair, in 
contrast, offers terms that Žižek sets out while writing of the most recent financial crisis in 
Greece:  
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben said in an interview ‘thought is the courage of 
hopelessness’ — an insight that is especially pertinent for our historical moment, when even 
the most pessimistic diagnosis as a rule finishes with an uplifting hint of some version of the 
proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. The true courage is not to imagine an alternative, but 
to accept the consequence of the fact that there is no clearly discernable alternative: the 
dream of an alternative is a sign of a theoretical cowardice; it functions as a fetish that 
prevents us thinking through to the end the deadlock of our predicament. In short, the true 
courage is to admit that the light at the end of the tunnel is most likely the headlights of 
another train approaching us from the opposite direction.150  
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Žižek’s suggestion is not the old conservative wisdom that the status quo cannot be 
improved upon; Žižek wants us instead to acknowledge that until we more fully understand the 
situation we find ourselves economically, socially, culturally, and psychically, we are doomed to 
run down the tracks into the oncoming trains of our refusal to stop and think. As capital demands 
constant motion to avoid reflection, so must we become immobile and think on the conditions 
and drives of our mobility. 
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Conclusion: Abandon All Hope, Ye Who Enter Here 
“I have not loved the World, nor the World me; 
I have not flattered its rank breath, nor bowed 
To its idolatries a patient knee, 
Nor coined my cheek to smiles,--nor cried aloud 
In worship of an echo: in the crowd 
They could not deem me one of such--I stood Among them, but not of them--in a shroud 
Of thoughts which were not their thoughts, and still could, Had I not filed my mind, which thus 
itself subdued.”  
-Lord Byron151 
      
After the election of Donald Trump to the office of President of the United States of 
America, I was able to critically self-reflect on the effects of the intellectual argument I had been 
crafting for the better part of the past few years. In the ideological climate that exists today, the 
signs and symptoms of Trump’s coming election ought to have been obvious. Despite the 
painfully obvious truth that Trump was a masterful manipulator of the psychic zeitgeist, I, a 
queer leftist, still held out a lesser-evilist hope that he would be electorally defeated by Hillary 
Clinton, a politician who almost perfectly embodies of the very neoliberalism I have argued 
against in this paper. Such, as I have finally convinced myself, is the blinding force and power of 
hope. It did not have to be this way, but it is. 
I first began reading and research for this paper almost three years ago and since then I 
have felt myself increasingly justified in choosing the topic of hope. Through this time I 
struggled greatly with my emotional connection to my own arguments. I struggled less with my 
belief that my contributions were intellectually sensical than with my belief that the intellectual 
sensibility of my argument resulted in a theoretical perspective sufficient for the increasingly 
reactional conditions of our cultural and political, and the dreadful consequences of this for our 
                                                
151 Byron, George Gordon Noel, sixth Baron Byron in “Childe Harold's Pilgrimage. “A Romaunt. Canto III.” 
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shared planet. What is the value of a post-ironic critique of hope in a time where hope may be the 
only psychic bulwark against the rising tide of far-right nationalism and xenophobia in Europe 
and its former imperial lands? Surely I cannot reasonably defend a position which would have 
educators such as myself, who stand atop a small mountain of privilege, should down to our 
increasingly marginalised students, “hey, don’t you know it sucks up here too!?”  
With this paper it is not my intention to take something from those who have nothing. 
What I may be lacking personally in hopeful affect, my socio-cultural positon allows me a 
comfortable life in an increasingly uncomfortable world. In this paper I have not addressed the 
material consequences of the disproportionately negative effects of neoliberal capital on socially 
marginalised groups, opting instead for an abstract-universalist approach focussed on individual 
psychology and interpersonal psychodynamics. Further study in this area would greatly benefit 
from a more material and narrative analysis of how despair and hope are specifically 
experienced, employed by, and used as weapons against, different racialized, religious, 
sexualized, gendered, and socio-economic groups.  
Beset upon from all sides by “cuckservatives,”152 faggy “beta-males”, “white-knights” 
and “social justice warriors”153 alike, the unbearable burden of Black Lives Matter’s ‘reverse-
racism’, and the liberal pontificating of “coastal” or “intellectual” elites,154 the right of Whites 
not only to dominate, but to take pleasure in their hegemony, is perceived to be rapidly eroding 
by those who live on its perilous cliffs. Trump supporters want to “make America great again,” 
demanding, tantrum-like, a return to a simpler time when they could reap the benefits bestowed 
upon them by both the ancient and contemporary traumas of the Other (the existence of which 
                                                
152 Conservatives who are perceived to have conceded too much politically and ideologically to progressivism. 
153 Pejorative terms for men who do not embody hypermasculinity, male feminists, and for anyone espousing a 
progressive/leftist perspective respectively. Often used in online discourse.  
154 Jews 
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attest to the fact that such a simpler time never existed). Knowing nothing but enjoyment in the 
patriarchy whose slow death they mourn so loudly, they cry out for Papa Trump to save them 
from the enemy within. Trump has masterfully offered his followers the father figure they so 
desperately crave; a father who gives his children the chance to regain something they never 
possessed but nonetheless feel deprived of; a father who offers them an end to their 
dissatisfaction; a father who loves them for who they are. In an era deemed “post-truth” by those 
whose unsupported faith in enlightenment values begins, finally, to fade; free of the burden of 
duty and the constraint of prohibition; Trump is our Father155 and aside from economic and 
social ruin he has but one offer and one demand of his children: enjoy! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
155 Trump is literally referred to as “Daddy” by gay fascist, alt-right mouthpiece, and icon of white supremacist 
jouissance Milo Yiannopoulos (and other gay Trump supporters). 
(http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2016/06/19/happy-fathers-day-daddy-donald/) 
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